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MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP: RESOLVING
UNINTENDED, PERVASIVE, PROFOUND HOMEOWNER
UNDERINSURANCE
KENNETH S. KLEIN*
A significant majority of homeowners in the United States
unwittingly have less insurance than necessary to rebuild their home in the
*

Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. Louis &
Hermione Brown Professorship in Preventative Law.
Writing on insurance, construction, and economics is challenging,
because there is so little publicly available information about insurance, and
so little economics or construction information that is published for the
uninitiated. As a consequence, even non-controversial propositions – such as
that an insurance producer receives a commission on the amount of premium
written, or that prices go up in the wake of natural disaster – can be difficult
to source and support with citation. This article depended upon the
generosity of many people who were willing to take my telephone calls and
shared with me their time and expertise. My thanks to Professor Peter
Siegelman from University of Connecticut School of Law; Professor Daniel
Schwarcz from the University of Minnesota Law School; Professor Howard
Kunreuther from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania;
Professor Tom Baker from the University of Pennsylvania School of Law;
Professor Jay Feinman from Rutgers Law; Professor Jeffrey Stempel from
the UNLV – William S. Boyd School of Law; Professor Benjamin L. Collier
from Temple University’s Department of Risk, Insurance, and Healthcare
Management; Professor Peter Kochenburger from University of Connecticut
School of Law; Amy Bach from United Policyholders; Valerie Saunders
from the National Association of Mortgage Brokers; Guy Kopperund from
CoreLogic; Todd Rissel from e2Value; Mark Whatley from Actionable
Insights; Chris McCloy of Yapacopia; David Shaffer from David Shaffer
Insurance Services; Gary T. Fye from Gary T. Fye Company; Attorney
Frederick C. Berry, Jr.; Jonathan Klein from Safe Auto, Ins. Co. (I love you
like a brother!); retired insurance executive Elliot Flood; Professor Martin
Grace from Temple University Fox School of Business; Madelyn Flanagan,
Vice President, Agent Development, Education, and Research of the
Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc.; and fire
restoration contactor and author, Sean Scott. The generosity of these
individuals should not be confused with their agreement with the views and
assertions I make in this Article. All errors are entirely my own, and any
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event of a complete loss. This persistent, multibillion-dollar protection gap
first emerged in the 1990s and has never resolved despite a desire by most
homeowners to contract for full replacement coverage. While a great deal of
academic and industry literature has addressed the issue of underinsurance,
the work has been done without reference to two sources that unlock the
conundrum. The first is the 1550+ page administrative rulemaking file of the
California Department of Insurance collected in the wake of wildfires in
2007. The second is a deep understanding of the software insurers use to
determine the adequacy of coverage limits when a homeowner purchases full
replacement coverage.
In addition to these two sources, this Article documents the problem
of underinsurance and its causes by synthesizing both prior scholarship and
primary source documents, including SEC filings, patents, industry websites,
and interviews with trade organization representatives. After establishing
the existence of widespread underinsurance, this Article demonstrates how
the law’s treatment of risk allocation in the wake of inadequate insurance
coverage encourages inaccurate coverage limits by uncoupling the risk
created by inaccurately calculated coverage limits from the responsibility
for the consequences of error. This Article concludes with a proposed
regulation that would recouple risk and responsibility while still providing
the insurance industry and consumers with the freedom to contract for
alternative coverage limits.

opinions a reader disagrees with are entirely mine as well.
Thanks to New Media Rights, it’s Executive Director, Professor Art
Neill, and two of its student interns – Erika Lee and Sarah Borrelli – who
researched the legal landscape of recording conversations with insurance
agents/brokers. Thanks to Supervising Deputy Attorney General Lisa Chao
of the California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, who
provided the Administrative Rulemaking File from Association of California
Insurance Companies, et al. v. Jones. Thanks to the excellent research
assistance of the staff of the Library at California Western School of Law,
and student research assistant David Bock.
Thanks to colleagues Professor Lisa Black, Professor Hannah Brenner,
and Professor Catherine Hardee who served as intellectual and textual
editors.
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INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of American homeowners do not have adequate
homeowner insurance,1 and almost none of them know it. Today, the systems
insurers use to identify recommended adequate coverage limits make
incidences of profound, unintended underinsurance ubiquitous.2
Understanding those systems is the key that unlocks the pervasive problem
of unintended underinsurance, yet is an undertaking previously largely
ignored by the academic and industry literature.
Most homeowners never lose their home, and so have no reason to
know whether their insurance is adequate. Until the 1990s, many if not most
homeowners had “guaranteed replacement coverage,” meaning coverage to
rebuild a home whatever the cost.3 This coverage has all but disappeared,
however, and now the ubiquitous form of homeowner insurance, even if
purportedly for “full” replacement of the home, has a coverage limit. As a
consequence, pervasive underinsurance is a predictable news story in the
wake of a natural disaster. In 2003, after the Cedar Fire in San Diego,
1

There is a lack of agreement regarding whether the correct generic
titling of standard insurance covering the loss of a residence is
“homeowners,” “homeowner’s,” “homeowners’,” or “homeowner”
insurance. This Article adopts the later convention – “homeowner.”
2
See Sara Nephew Hassani, Magnifying Disaster: The Causes and
Consequences of Home Underinsurance 106 (April 2013) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Princeton University) (“insurers are aware – and have
been aware since at least the late 1930s – that insurance values are far below
actual post-disaster replacement costs”). The reinsurer Swiss Re cautions that
technically the delta between the economically ideal coverage and the
insured loss is ‘underinsurance,’ while the delta between total economic loss
and insured loss is a ‘protection gap.’ Swiss Re, Underinsurance of property
risk:
closing
the
gap,
5
SIGMA
1,
2
(2015),
http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma5_2015_en.pdf. This Article uses
both the terms “underinsurance” and “protection gap” to refer to the
difference between the coverage limits in a homeowner policy for
replacement of a lost dwelling, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
actual cost to replace. This is also sometimes referred to as the need to have
“insurance to value,” or ITV.
3
See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market
Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance,
18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y L. 345, 385 (2011); JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY,
DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT
YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 135-36 (2010).
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California, the California Department of Insurance found itself besieged by
stories of homeowners who were shocked to find they did not have enough
insurance to rebuild their homes.4 The same happened after catastrophic
California wildfires in 2007 and 2008.5 The Texas Department of Insurance
received large numbers of homeowner complaints regarding denials, delays,
and claims handling both after the 2011 wildfires and after Hurricane Harvey
in 2017.6 In the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Florida Division of
Banking, Insurance and Financial Regulation received “a higher number of
insurance claimants than the division expected” from “homeowners who had
insurance policies that covered less than 80 percent of their property’s
appraised replacement cost,” and while the division could not give a
percentage as to how many homeowners were over 20% underinsured, the
number was “high enough to warrant an emergency order issued by [the]
division.”7 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, litigation in Louisiana
blossomed by homeowners who felt duped by the mistaken belief that they
had sufficient insurance.8 The same happened in New Jersey after Hurricane
4

See, e.g., Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10,
§ 2695.183 at 1103, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1009
(2015) (No. B248622), rev’d, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395 (2017) (“The policy
underlying the proposed action is to assure that homeowners receive from
Department licensees more accurate replacement value estimates regarding
their insured structures. The Department and the California Legislature
received a significant number of complaints by homeowners who lost their
residences in the Southern California wildfires of 2003....[F]ire survivors
complained about problems including their experience that after the fire they
learned that the replacement value estimates made in setting coverage limits
for their homes was too low, causing underinsurance issues to arise during
efforts to rebuild or replace their residences.”).
5
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 29-274, 319-1026.
6
Tex. Dep’t of Ins. Response to TDI Open Records request 194243 (on
file with author).
7
Senate Hears of Post Hurricane Insurance Complaints, ST. JOHN
SOURCE (Feb. 21. 2018), https://stjohnsource.com/2018/02/21/senate-hearsexplanation-of-post-hurricane-complaints/. See also Osbert E. Potter,
Emergency
Order
on
Underinsurance
(Feb.
14,
2018),
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/
files/2018/02/emergency-order-on-underinsurance.pdf.
8
See, e.g., Freeman v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 06-8794, 2007 WL 519234
(E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2007); Ruiz v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 06-5640,
2007 WL 128800 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2007); Halmekangas v. ANPAC La. Ins.
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Sandy.9
Natural disasters do not create, but rather expose and exacerbate the
depth and breadth of underinsurance. When wildfires ravaged California in
2007, the California Department of Insurance (“CDOI”) comprehensively
studied the problem of underinsurance. The resulting 1550+ page
administrative rulemaking file describes how insurers deploy software that
purports to account for the likelihood of weather events causing mass loss
and concomitant price surges. Yet even when a homeowner both relied on
that software to calculate adequate coverage limits and bought 25%, 50%,
100% or even more additional coverage on top of the coverage the insurer
and/or producer recommended, over half of homeowners were still
underinsured. Despite the dramatic findings of the CDOI, the administrative
record has not been analyzed in any academic literature to date. Simply put,
the academic record helps confirm what until now was only inferred – that
across the United States, most homeowners are materially underinsured, and
are unaware of that fact. Most homeowners think they have more than
adequate insurance.
Co., 95 So. 3d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 2012); D’Amico v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
No. 06-7174, 2007 WL 854308 (E.D. La. Mar. 15,2007); Dobson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., Nos. 06-0252, 06-1097, 06-1064, 06-1255, 06-1734, 06-1585, 2006
WL 2078423 (E.D. La. July 21, 2006); Campo v. State Farm Ins. Co., No.
06-7324, 2007 WL 840125 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2007); Tillery v. State Farm
Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 06-6876, 2007 WL 805785 (E.D. La. Mar. 13,
2007). These are the residential underinsurance cases from just the first
twenty responsive cases to a Westlaw search in just Louisiana state and
federal cases, searching for “‘Hurricane Katrina’ & underinsure!” (search
performed on March 2, 2018). These cases often were reported – in other
words, showed up in the WL database – only because of a federal district
court decision on a remand motion after removal. Put another way, these
cases are just the tip of the iceberg that was the post-Katrina underinsurance
litigation.
9
See, e.g., Linblad v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-908, 2014 WL
6895775 (D. N.J. Dec. 4, 2014); Bannon v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-1229,
2015 WL 778828 (D. N.J. Fed 24, 2015); Robert v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No
14-06308, 2015 WL 4138990 (D. N.J. July 8, 2015). Again, these are just
the first three of 92 responsive cases identified within Westlaw to the search
– within just New Jersey state and federal cases – “‘Hurricane Sandy’ &
insurance” (search conducted on March 3, 2018). All three of these cases
involve homeowners who were underinsured and sued their insurers, and all
are in the Westlaw database because of procedural motions leading to early
written trial court orders. Like with Hurricane Katrina, this paints a
suggestive picture of a much, much larger body of filed litigation.
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The explanation for the prevalence of profound, unintended
underinsurance lies with the cost estimator software insurers use to
recommend coverage limits. The CDOI only briefly alluded to this software,
and the academic world studying insurance appears largely unaware of it.
These replacement cost estimators are at the heart of the problem. Through
a combination of software design choices in the way that insurance is bought
and sold, underinsurance is almost inevitable. For example, the software
allows for a “shortcut” calculation rather than detailed analysis, and insurers
compensate producers in ways that encourage using the shortcut. While the
software can recalculate replacement costs and adequate coverage limits
annually, producers are incentivized to not do so for fear of losing existing
customers. The software requires time and expertise to accurately detail all
construction components, but the deployment of the software usually relies
on the homeowner to input data by answering a handful of questions in a few
minutes. These are just some of many software features combined with
incentives that routinely cause inadequate calculations of replacement costs
that get worse over time.
For insurers, the prevalence of inadequate and eroding coverage
limits resulting from cost estimators is a feature, not a glitch. Cost estimating
software creates the opportunity to capture and retain more market share by
selling nominally ‘full’ but actually inadequate insurance coverage. It is an
unusual market where a buyer wants and is willing to pay for a more
expensive product than the seller has sold. What is particularly peculiar in
homeowner insurance, however, is that the insurer is aware this is occurring,
and the homeowner is not. As big data companies, insurers have known for
the better part of three decades that most homeowner insurance has
profoundly inadequate coverage limits, and that the policyholder does not
know it. But the legal landscape frequently protects and encourages the
insurer. Thus, under the current legal landscape of regulation, legislation,
and decisional law, because of the ways cost estimators function and
insurance is quoted, homeowners usually bear the cost of a shortfall. In turn,
the insurer can more than make up in captured and retained business any
actual liability for underinsurance.
This is what many economists would call a ‘moral hazard problem.’
Nobel Prize-winning economist, Paul Krugman, defines ‘moral hazard’ as,
“any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk
to take, while someone else bears the cost of things going badly.”10 As Peter
10

See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND
CRISIS OF 2008 63 (W.W. Norton Co. Ltd. 2009). See also, Definition
of
‘Moral
Hazard’,
ECON.
TIMES,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-haz
THE
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Molk, explains, “insurance brings the potential for perverse increases in risk
levels and losses….”11
Exposing the problem also points to a solution. Unintentional
underinsurance can be resolved by rejoining risk and responsibility, which
can be achieved without constraining the business flexibility or viability of
insurers.
This Article will unwind the confluence of misplaced incentives,
software, expectations, regulation, and legal interpretation that all cohere to
create pervasive, unwitting underinsurance in the United States. Part I of this
Article documents and roughly quantifies what is intuitively understood but
hard to confirm – that underinsurance is pervasive in the United States. Part
II isolates the prevalence of homeowners unintentionally underinsuring. Part
III describes the cost estimating tools used by insurers, and the human factors
that intersect with those tools result in inadequate replacement cost
estimates. Part IV collects anecdotal data to bolster or undermine the
theoretical predictions of Parts I-III. Part V describes the mechanisms of
allocation of risk from underinsurance. Part VI describes how unwitting
underinsurance is a moral hazard-like problem. Finally, Part VII suggests
reform – allowing insurers to calculate coverage limits however an insurer
wishes, but making the insurer bear the cost of error.
I.

COVERAGE LIMITS ARE PERVASIVELY INADEQUATE TO
REPLACE A LOST HOME

In 2007, Marshall & Swift/Boeckh (“MSB”), the company that at
that time manufactured the industry standard software insurers used to
calculate insurance coverage limits, reported that for the years it studied,
roughly 60% of American homeowners were underinsured by roughly 2025%.12 This was not a description of neighborhoods after a flood or fire but
rather a snapshot of the entirety of the housing stock in the United States.

ard; Tejvan Pettinger, Moral Hazard, ECON. HELP (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.eco
nomicshelp.org/blog/105/economics/what-is-moral-hazard/. (“Examples of
moral hazard include: Comprehensive insurance policies decrease incentive
to take care of your possessions…. Governments promising to bail out lossmaking banks can encourage banks to take greater risks.”).
11
Peter Molk, Playing with Fire? Testing Moral Hazard in Homeowners
Insurance Valued Policies, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 347, 349 (2018).
12
PETER M.WELLS, INSURING TO VALUE: MEETING A CRITICAL NEED
46 (2d ed. 2007).
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While the underlying data supporting that conclusion has never been
disclosed, MSB has been cited for it even by insurers.13
Indeed, empirical verification and quantification of underinsurance
is elusive. Even general information about insurance – such as what
insurance coverage a company offers – is hard to come by. The insurance
industry is, to put it mildly, parsimonious with data.14 And when it comes to
pervasive, inadequate, nominally ‘full’ insurance coverage, an insurer has
little if any reason to gratuitously aggregate and publicly self-proffer
potentially derogatory data. Nor does a regulator likely have the resources
(or the necessary reasonable suspicion) to investigate potential systemic
problems in response to a single, disgruntled homeowner complaining of a
one-off underinsured loss claim.15
Thus, until very recently, there was no reliable source to verify or
contradict the MSB conclusions. But that has changed with the combination
of a new study on flood insurance and a California Department of Insurance
Market Conduct investigation that recently made its way into a public court
file. It can be concluded with confidence that most American homeowners
nominally have coverage limits described as adequate to fully replace a lost
home, and most of the time that coverage is inadequate. Further, it appears
the frequency of underinsurance may be closer to 80% than to 60%.
A.

THE PREVALENCE OF NOMINALLY ‘FULL’ REPLACEMENT
COVERAGE

Professor Jay Feinman writes, “96 percent of homeowners carry
insurance.”16 But not all homeowner insurance provides replacement
coverage. A homeowner may have the option to purchase either “actual cash
13

Chubb, Homes, https://www2.chubb.com/us-en/individuals-families/
Homes.aspx (last visited March 12, 2018) (citing a “2013 survey by Marshall
and Swift/Boeckh” which states that “an estimated 60% of homeowners do
not have comprehensive protection.”).
14
See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack
of Transparency in Insurance Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 413-53
(2014).
15
The matter is further complicated because several states have adopted
an NAIC-recommended protocol that empowers state regulators to aggregate
market data from insurers in exchange for a commitment that the data remain
confidential. See generally Frederick C. Berry, Jr., Shining a Light on Insurer
Misconduct, https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/shinnin
g_a_light_on_insurer_misconduct_12_1_0.pdf.
16
Feinman, supra note 3, at 122.
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value” coverage (ACV) or “replacement cost value” coverage (RCV).17 And
not all consumers purchasing RCV opt for ‘full’ coverage limits.
All that said, likely most homeowners do buy RCV and a relatively
small percentage of policyholders choose ‘less than full insurance coverage.’
In 2010 the trade magazine, Insurance Journal, reported that according to
insurer-commissioned survey results, 71% of homeowners thought their
homes were insured for the full cost to rebuild (and were willing to pay a
higher premium to get that).18 In a 2017 study of homeowners required to
purchase flood insurance, Professors Collier and Ragin found that given the
choice between less than full, full, or more than full replacement cost
coverage limits, only 20.45% of homeowners opted for less than full
coverage limits.19 There is no published study reaching a materially different
result for standard homeowner’s insurance.
While the Collier and Ragin work focused on flood insurance rather
than standard homeowner insurance, there are a variety of reasons to
extrapolate the findings of the Collier and Ragin study to standard
homeowner insurance. For the most part, standard homeowner insurance is
required – if a home has a mortgage then it must have insurance protecting
the lender.20 As a consequence, for roughly 70% of homes the required
coverage will be for 80% or more of the mortgage. 21 But when selecting
FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT PROVIDING
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET FOR NATURAL
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Sept. 2015),
17

https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/nat
ural%20Catastrophe%20Report.pdf; See generally Johnny Parker,
Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295
(1999).
18
Homeowners Coverage Knowledge Gap Wide Among Consumers,
INS. J. (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/20
10/08/24/112704.htm.
19
Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, The Influence of Sellers on
Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance 6-8, 12, tbl.3 (Fox School
of Business Research Paper No. 18-017, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=31
62388. Usually flood insurance is optional. Standard homeowner insurance,
by contrast, is required by any mortgage. But Collier and Ragin confined
their study to homeowners who were required to purchase flood insurance.
Id. at 6.
20
Kenneth S. Klein, Following the Money – The Chaotic Kerfuffle When
Insurance Proceeds Simultaneously are the Only Rebuild Funds and the
Only Mortgage Collateral, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 305, 308 (2009).
21
According to the 2015 Housing Survey, of the 56,337,000 owner-
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coverage limits, standard homeowner insurance is cheap. For example in
2015, the average premium for homeowner insurance in the United States
was $1,168,22 while the average premium to insure a single automobile was
$1,009.23 Or put another way, the average annual cost of auto insurance for
an American homeowner with two cars is 42% more than their annual cost
of home insurance.24 Because standard insurance is comparatively cheap,
there often may be little additional annual expense to a policyholder in
purchasing 80% vs. ‘full’ RCV.25
Further, there is a financial incentive for a homeowner to purchase
full replacement insurance. Most property insurance policies contain a

occupied homes reporting how their purchase or construction was financed,
all but 16,545,000 had a down payment of 20% or less. American Housing
Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2015), https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html#?s_areas=a00000&s_year
=n2015&s_tableName=Table13&s_byGroup1=a1&s_byGroup2=a1&s_filt
erGroup1=t1&s_filterGroup2=g1&s_show=S. In other words, by the terms
of their mortgages, slightly over 70% of all mortgaged homes were required,
at the time of purchase or construction, to have insurance of at least 80% of
the purchase or construction price. In 2015, over 60% of all owner-occupied
homes with a mortgage had property insurance as part of the monthly
mortgage payment. Id.
22
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,
DWELLING FIRE, HOMEOWNERS OWNER OCCUPIED, AND HOMEOWNER
TENANT AND CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE UNIT OWNER’S INSURANCE
REPORT:
DATA
FOR
2015
at
34,
tbl.4
(2017),
http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/HMR-ZU-17.pdf.
23
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, AUTO INS. DATABASE REPORT
2014/2015 at 27, tbl.5 (2017), http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/AUT-PB14.pdf.
24
Accord INS. INFO. INST., 2016 Consumer Insurance Survey –
Homeowner Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices at
3, Fig. 2 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulsewp-020217-final.pdf (“...only 31 percent of Americans consider homeowner
insurance to be a financial burden.”).
25
Accord INS. INFO. INST., 2016 Consumer Insurance Survey –
Homeowner Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices at
3, fig.2 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulsewp-020217-final.pdf (“[O]nly 31 percent of Americans consider homeowner
insurance to be a financial burden.”).
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“coinsurance provision.”26 These provisions penalize a homeowner for less
than 80% insured.27
But perhaps more to the point, it bears recognizing what Collier and
Ragin have been studying. Their goal has been to isolate what the influence
of producers (any person or entity licensed to negotiate, solicit, or sell
insurance28) of insurance and insurers are on the selection of coverage
amounts.29 They chose the context of flood insurance sold to homeowners
who are required to purchase it because the product is identical no matter
what insurer offers it – in other words, the only variable is the seller.30 Collier
and Ragin characterize their “main result” as showing “that insurers help
select households’ flood insurance contracts.”31 Importantly, the insurers’
impact is not trivial, but rather the insurer “significantly affect[s]” the
selected coverage amount.32
The import of this finding is central to the question of the frequency
of homeowners purchasing ‘full’ replacement coverage in their standard
homeowner insurance. Producers – whether captive or independent – are
compensated based on the percentage of premium written.33 Commissions
26

See ALLEN FIN. INS. GRP., Coinsurance Defined & Coinsurance
Explained, https://www.eqgroup.com/coinsurance/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2018).
27
Id.; see also Yoong-Sin Lee, A Graphical Treatment of the
Coinsurance Clause, 52 J. RISK & INS. 644 (1985); IRMI, Coinsurance
Provision, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/coinsuranceprovision (last visited Sept. 8, 2018); William K. Austin, Property
Insurance: Coinsurance, IRMI (2012), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert
-commentary/property-insurance-coinsurance.
28
What is an Insurance Producer?, CT Ins. Dept., www.ct.gov/cid/lib/
cid/anscomle.rtf (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
29
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 1.
30
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 1.
31
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 4.
32
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 18, 23-25.
33
Rick Mikolasek, How Much Do Insurance Agents Make?, THE TRUTH
ABOUT INS. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.thetruthaboutinsurance.com/howmuch-do-insurance-agents-make/; John Cain, How Much Do Insurance
Agents Make, U.S. INS. AGENTS, https://usinsuranceagents.com/how-muchdo-insurance-agents-make; Become An Agent: Agent Costs &
Compensation, STATE FARM, https://www.statefarm.com/careers/becomean-agent/why-state-farm/cost-compensation (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
Accord E-mail from Madelyn Flannagan, Vice President, Agent Dev., Educ.,
& Research, Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc., to
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positively relate to the amount of coverage.34 More coverage leads to more
premium which in turn leads to more commission. In this environment of
incentives for full insurance and disincentives for less than full insurance, it
is hard to articulate a reason to expect that the percent of ‘full’ RCV coverage
limits for standard homeowner coverage is different than for required flood
insurance.
All of this suggests that roughly 80% of all homeowners have what
they think is standard homeowner insurance coverage limits adequate to fully
replace their home if it is lost. Indeed, Madelyn Flannagan – the Vice
President, Agent Development, Education, and Research of the Independent
Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc. (the trade organization for
independent insurance agents) – reports that “at least” 65%-85% of
homeowners have full replacement coverage.35
B.

THE PREVALENCE OF INADEQUATE REPLACEMENT COVERAGE

Since the overwhelming majority of homeowners want, and are
willing to pay for full insurance, one would expect that the overwhelming
majority of homeowners have adequate coverage to rebuild in the instance
of a total loss. Usually this does not seem like the case.
United Policyholders (“UP”), a pre-eminent consumer advocacy
group, has been tracking and working to solve the underinsurance problem
since the 1991 Oakland/Berkeley firestorm.36 As part of the organization’s
Roadmap to Recovery work in disaster areas it surveys survivors.37 Even
allowing for some selection effect, the data describes profound
underinsurance. Twenty-four months after the 2007 Southern California
Fires, 66% of respondents reported they were underinsured by an average of
Ken Klein (Mar. 29, 2018) (on file with author).
34
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19 at 4.
35
E-mail from Madelyn Flannagan, Vice President, Agent Dev., Educ.,
& Research, Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc., to
Ken Klein (Mar. 29, 2018) (on file with author).
36
Our Mission, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, https://www.uphelp.org/abou
t/mission (last visited May 11, 2018).
37
Data Collection Surveys: Roadmap to Recovery Surveys, UNITED
POLICYHOLDERS, https://www.uphelp.org/roadmap-recovery-surveys (last
visited Dec. 9, 2018). (“Our Purpose: To collect data from disaster survivors
on insurance claims and recovery progress at various intervals; identify
coverage issues, individual and common problems and solutions, assess the
pace of recovery and the claims handling performance of the various insurers
in the region.”).
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$319,500.38 Twelve months after the 2010 San Bruno Gas Explosion/Fire,
50% of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of
$200,000.39 Twelve months after the 2010 Fourmile Canyon Fire, 64% of
respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of
$200,000.40 Twelve months after the 2011 Central Texas Wildfire, 56% of
respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of
$110,000.41 One year after the 2012 Colorado High Park & Woodland
Heights Wildfires, and Waldo Canyon Wildfire, respondents self-reported
underinsurance respectively 54%, by an average of $101,000 and 27.2% by
an average of $77,000.42 Six months after the 2013 Black Forest Fire, 38%
of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of
$100,000.43 Six months after the 2015 Butte Fire, 65.22% of respondents
self-reported they were underinsured.44 Six months after the 2015 Valley
Fire, 53% of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average
of $103,000.45 Six months after the 2017 North Bay fires 66% of respondents
self-reported they were underinsured on the dwelling portion of their claim
by an average of $317,000.46
Other sources (reporting conclusions from undisclosed
methodology) come to similar conclusions. A 2015 research paper by Swiss
Re describes that in the US and Canada, properties valued at under $5 million
are underinsured by an average of 38%.47 A Princeton University doctoral
candidate found “the vast majority of interviewed 2003 fire survivors
reported that the amount of compensation available to them under their
[coverage] limited policies was much less than the cost required to
rebuild.”48 The financial-focused media entity, CNBC, reports, “According
to real estate data company CoreLogic, more than half of homeowner
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Butte Fire – 6 Month Survey, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS,
http://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/attachments/buttefire_6mo_results
.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
45
UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, supra note 37.
46
North Bay Fires – 6 Month Survey Results, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS,
https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/attachments/north_bay_fires__6_month_survey_results_v.2_4.26.18.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
47
Swiss Re, supra note 2, at 22.
48
Hassani, supra fn. 2 at 149.
39
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insurance policies have a maximum payout that is less than the cost to rebuild
the home in the event of a catastrophic loss. Moreover, CoreLogic reports
that 1 in 4 homes is protected with a homeowner policy that would cover less
than 80 percent of the cost to replace the home.”49
This set of converging conclusions is suggestive but does not
necessarily equate to rigorous study. A more rigorous study, however, has
emerged in an administrative rulemaking file of the CDOI, filed in defense
of a regulatory change in the state insurance code.
In the wake of wildfires in Southern California in 2007, the CDOI
studied the problem of underinsurance.50 The outgrowth of that work was the
addition in 2011 of section 2695.183 to Title 10 of the California Code of
Regulations (seeking to make replacement cost estimates more adequate).
The insurance industry challenged the new regulation in court, with litigation
that ultimately ended with a 2017 Opinion by the California Supreme
Court.51 And buried in the Administrative Rulemaking File that the CDOI
filed with the trial court is the market conduct study the CDOI performed on
the prevalence of underinsurance amongst homeowners generally as well as
amongst homeowners who had purchased “extended coverage.”52
49

Carla Fried, Recent Disasters are a Wake-Up Call to Check your
Homeowners Insurance, CNBC (Sept. 5, 2017, 9:01 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/05/harvey-is-a-wake-up-call-to-checkyour-homeowners-insurance.html.
50
Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1191-93 (2017).
51
Id. at 1194-95.
52
Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 1027-30. The work was
done by the Department of Insurance’s Market Conduct Division (“MCD”),
and before being submitted to the court was reviewed by the Bureau Chief
of the Field Rating and Underwriting Bureau. Id. MCD “commenced
examinations of four insurers who together accounted for approximately
50% of the market share in the residential property insurance line at the time”
– Farmers, Allstate, State Farm, and Travelers. Id. The “examinations
targeted the claim-handling practices related to total losses that resulted from
the [2007 El Dorado, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, San Diego, and
Ventura] wildfires, and the underwriting practices related to insurance to
value and the customer’s selection of coverage limits when purchasing and
continuing the policy.” Id. “Similar processes surrounding the dwelling of
replacement cost and the selection of Coverage A dwelling limits were
observed in each of the four examinations.” Id. “In general, each insurer had
its own replacement cost estimating tool and value generated by this tool and
the value generated by this tool was considered (from the insurer’s
perspective) to be the minimum Coverage A limit for which the policy could
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The CDOI’s focus on extended coverage is important – “Extended
coverage is based on a basic coverage amount that is equal to or greater than
the estimated replacement cost. In fact, extended coverage cannot be
provided unless the basic coverage is at least as great as the estimated
replacement cost of the property.”53 In other words, underinsurance amongst
homeowners with extended coverage is, by definition, unwitting
underinsurance – homeowners who wanted full coverage, were willing to
pay for full coverage, and indeed who thought they had more than full
coverage.54
The California Supreme Court later described the survey results, as
well as some of its methodology:
In 2008, the Department of Insurance’s market conduct division
conducted an investigation of the four largest insurers—ones that
together accounted for approximately half the market covering these
losses. The survey revealed that for a majority of the policies
examined, coverage limits matched what was indicated by the
insurer’s own coverage calculator. But the recommended coverage
nonetheless understated what was actually needed to rebuild the
insured’s home over 80 percent of the time. Even when the
homeowner had purchased extended replacement cost coverage, 57

be issued.” Id. “MCD staff examined a total of 188 policies during these
examinations. In 126 of these cases, the Coverage A limit selected matched
the figure produced by the insurer’s tool…of these 126 cases, the Coverage
A limit was lower than the cost to rebuild following the loss in 102 cases.”
Id. “When factoring in any extended replacement cost coverage that applied,
72 continued to be underinsured for the total loss.” Id. “[T]he examinations
revealed that regardless of the insurers’ stated positions, the policyholder is
relying upon the insurer’s estimate…to select Coverage A limits in a
significant number of cases.” Id.
53
Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No. B248622, 2014 WL 1576212 at
*34 (Cal. App. 2d. Apr. 4, 2014) (Respondent’s Brief).
54
See, e.g., State Farm’s answer in 2008 to why for one of its insureds it
did nothing to confirm that the Coverage A limit was high enough to qualify
the insured for extended replacement cost extensions that the insured had:
“The underwriter did not need to confirm that the Coverage A limit was high
enough…because the Coverage A amount selected by the insured met or
exceeded the insurance-to-value estimate.” Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal.
App. 4th at 698.
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percent of these policies still underinsured their policyholders
relative to the cost of rebuilding their homes.55
All of this data is in harmony – roughly 80% of Americans do not
have ‘full’ insurance, and most are short by a material amount.
II.

THE PREVALENCE OF UNINTENDED, INADEQUATE FULL
COVERAGE LIMITS

Sometimes when insurance coverage limits are inadequate to rebuild
a home that is a homeowner’s intention. As reinsurer Swiss Re notes,
“undervaluation of residential property…can be driven by homeowner…
policy choice based on affordability rather than adequate coverage.”56
Indeed, some economists theorize an economically rational actor’s ‘optimal’
amount of insurance coverage often may not be full insurance.57 This all
raises the question of how a homeowner decides on coverage limits.
Many homeowners do not devote much time or attention to
purchasing or renewing homeowner’s insurance According to a survey by
the Insurance Information Institute (“I.I.I.”), less than half of homeowner
insurance policyholders comparison shop at all when their policy is up for

55

Jones, 2 Cal. 5th at 383.
Swiss Re, supra fn. 2 at 22.
57
See, e.g., Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 553 (1968). But see Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline
Meszaros, & Howard Kunruether, Framing, Probability Distortions, and
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 36 (1993) (“There is
abundant evidence, although much of it is anecdotal, that consumers do not
make these decisions rationally.”). See also Vernon L. Smith, Optimal
Insurance Coverage, 76 J. POL. ECON. 68 (1968); George G. Szpiro, Optimal
Insurance Coverage, 52 J. RISK & INS. 704 (1985); Artur Raviv, The Design
of an Optimal Insurance Policy, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 84 (1979), reprinted
in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS: READINGS IN ECONOMICS
AND FINANCE 251, 261 (Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington, eds.)
(Kluwer 1991) (“the Pareto optimal insurance contract involves a deductible
and co- insurance of losses above the deductible.”). But see Christian Gollier,
Optimal Insurance Design: What Can We Do With and Without Expected
Utility? printed in GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 97-115
(Kluwer 2000) (arguing that if information is adequate and symmetrical, the
optimal insurance for a risk adverse purchaser may be full insurance,
depending upon various factors, such as the type of deductible).
56
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renewal,58 and of those who do comparison shop, well over half do so either
by phone or online59 (neither of which are processes conducive to the kind
of detailed inquiry needed to properly determine coverage limits adequate to
fully fund a rebuild of a home). Indeed, because for over 60% of homeowners
with a mortgage,60 their insurance premium is a component of their mortgage
payment, the price of insurance may be essentially invisible.
And even for the engaged customer, there is little reason to expect a
productive price comparison. According to the I.I.I., 70% of homeowner
insurance – measured by premium – is directly written, meaning through
captive agents, the internet, or other direct means.61 Directly written
insurance does not generate a price comparison of two or more insurers.62
This all would suggest a lack of price sensitivity by purchasers of
homeowner’s insurance. This is interesting, because academic research is
inconsistent about whether property insurance customers are price elastic.63
Yet one must ask whether resolving this inconsistency matters, since as a
former insurance executive confirms, “Insurance companies believe their
customers are extremely price sensitive, and for this reason are more likely
to seek to reduce premium than increase coverage.”64
58

INS. INFO. INST., supra note 24, at 13.
Id.
60
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 21.
61
Background on: Buy Insurance: Evolving Distribution Channels INS.
INFO. INST., (last visited Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/backgroun
d-on-buying-insurance. A report published by the Independent Insurance
Agents & Brokers Association of America, Inc. places this figure at 55.7%.
Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 2017 Market Share Report
at “Homeowners” Table, https://www.independentagent.com/Resources/Re
earch/SiteAssets/MarketShareReport/default/2017-Market-Share-Final.pdf.
62
Some confirmation that the difference between captive and
independent agent matters is a study of the purchase of flood insurance that
found the coverage behavior of agents differed depending upon whether the
agent was a captive agent or an independent agent. Collier, supra note 19, at
4, 31.
63
Grace, supra note 25, at 362 Table 4; accord INS. SERV. OFFICE,
Managing Catastrophe Risk 4 (1996) (“An insurer willing to pay the price
of sufficient catastrophe insurance could have trouble competing for
business.”). But see Justin Sydnor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, 2. AM.
ECON. J. 179 (2010) (finding Americans are inefficiently risk averse and so
pay more than they should for low deductibles).
64
Email from Elliott Flood to Ken Klein (Mar. 9, 2018). (Explaining the
related issue of policyholder behavior, Molk confirmed the primacy of belief
59
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But generalized price elasticity does not necessarily equate to
intended less than nominally ‘full’ RCV. While real or perceived price
elasticity could result in less than full coverage limits to reduce premiums,65
it also could manifest in higher deductibles to reduce premiums,66 aggressive
comparison shopping between insurers, or some combination of these
factors.67
Stephan Young, Senior Vice President & General Counsel of the
trade association, Insurance Brokers and Agents of the West, suggests that
the answer is intentional understated replacement cost both by producers and
their customers:
Both insurers and homeowners have an economic incentive to
underestimate replacement costs. Simply put, the lower the
replacement cost valuation, the lower the premium. And the lower
the premium, the more likely an insurer is to sell its policies in a
highly competitive marketplace, and the more money a homeowner
can save.68
But that explanation falls flat when – as the CDOI found with
frequency – insurance coverage is inadequate even with the purchase of
extended coverage.
In reality, most policyholders almost certainly are without reflection
following the advice generated by a producer or insurer of what coverage
limit is adequate to fully replace a home. Why? Because doing just that is
the unanimous advice of anyone knowledgeable about buying insurance.
in explaining behavior). Molk, supra note 11, at 6-7.
65
Swiss Re, supra note 2, at 21.
66
Grace, supra note 25, at 378 (“[Explaining] that consumers tend to
follow experts’ advice to increase their deductibles and use the premium
savings to purchase additional coverage that offers a better value in terms of
protection against risk”). But see Johnson, supra note 57, at 42 (“Consumers
appear to dislike deductibles.”); Sydnor, supra note 63 (customers overpay
for lower deductibles).
67
But see Benjamin Collier, Howard Kunreuther, Erwann MichelKerjan, & Daniel Schwartz, Risk Preferences in Small and Large Stakes:
Evidence from Insurance Contract Decisions, NBER Working Paper No.
w23579 (July 17, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003717 (examining risk
preferences in flood insurance, policyholders have substantial risk aversion,
strongly preferring low deductibles and high coverages).
68
Administrative Rulemaking File for Cal. Code Regs., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1198.
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State Departments of Insurance across the country advise homeowners to ask
their insurer or agent for the amount of coverage necessary to replace a
home.69

See, e.g. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., Homeowners Insurance (September
2017), www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/cb025.html (“Ask your insurance
company if you aren’t sure how much it would cost to rebuild your home….
Consider whether your property coverage limits are high enough to replace
your house…. You can increase property…coverages if you don’t think they
are high enough.”); STATE OF WIS., OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF INS.,
Frequently Asked Questions, Homeowner’s Insurance 2 (Jan. 2017),
https://oci.wi.gov/Documents/Consumers/PI-232.pdf (“[a]mount should
equal the cost of rebuilding your home in the event that it is destroyed….
Your agent will be able to assist you in determining the amount of insurance
that is appropriate for your home…”); IND. DEP’T OF INS., Property
Insurance, https://www.in.gov/iDOI/2573.html (“To adequately insure your
dwelling, you must know its replacement value. If you aren’t sure of your
home’s value, play it safe and get help from your agent.”); PENN. DEP’T OF
INS., Insurance Facts for Pennsylvania Consumers, Your Guide to
Homeowners Insurance 6-7, http://www.insurance.pa.gov/Coverage/Docum
ents/homeowners.pdf (“It is important to insure your home to replacement
cost value because under certain circumstances you may be subject to a
recovery amount less than what it would cost you to restore your home to its
pre-loss condition.… You should also check with your agent or insurance
company at least once a year to make sure your policy provides adequate
coverage.”); N.C DEP’T OF INS., A Consumer Guide to Homeowner’s
Insurance 15 (2010), http://www.ncDOI.com/_Publications/Consumer%20
Guide%20to%20Homeowners%20Insurance_CHO1.pdf (“You should also
discuss your insurance needs with an insurance agent. It is this person’s job
to help you choose the right type and amount of insurance.”);
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., STATE CORP. COMM’N, Homeowners Insurance:
Consumer’s Guide 15 (2011), https://www.scc.virginia.gov/boi/pubs/hoguid
e.pdf (“The first step towards determining what policy limits you need is to
determine what it would cost to replace your house. The best way to do this
is to have an appraiser estimate how much it would cost to rebuild your home
if it were totally destroyed and document his estimate in writing. However,
appraisals are expensive, so you may want to rely on advice from your
insurance agent. Most agents have charts and home replacement cost
estimation procedures to help you determine how much insurance you need.
If you are not sure of the replacement cost of your house, ask your agent for
help.”).
69
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The I.I.I. describes itself as “the leading independent source of
objective information, insight, analysis and referral on insurance.”70 The I.I.I.
website posted an article entitled, How much homeowner insurance do I
need?, and describes, among other things that “… your insurer will provide
a recommended coverage limit for the structure of your home….”71 In
another informational document the I.I.I. generates for homeowners, it
advises, “[t]he amount of insurance you buy should be based on rebuilding
costs…. Your insurance agent or company representative generally can
calculate rebuilding costs for you….”72
The National Association of Mortgage Bankers (“NAMB”)
describes itself as “…the voice of the mortgage industry representing the
interests of mortgage professionals and homebuyers since 1973.”73 The
NAMB’s Executive Director describes that in order to close a purchase of a
mortgaged home, typically the anticipated insurer provides to the anticipated
lender a binder that reflects the “proposed dwelling coverage which would
include replacement cost of the home.”74 Indeed, the Executive Director of
the NAMB reports that she “would presume that the insurer would inform
the consumer regarding the maximum coverage that they would be able to
purchase based on replacement cost.”75
In testimony before the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, Ron Papa, past President of the National Association of
Public Insurance Adjusters, explained, “Many consumers believe having
insurance equates to having insurance for everything and that is the way
some in the industry seem to like it.”76
70

INS. INFO. INST., About Us, https://www.iii.org/about-us (last visited
Feb. 20, 2018). It bears mention, however, that the membership of the Board
of Directors of the I.I.I. is 100% comprised of representatives from insurers
and reinsurers. INS. INFO. INST., 2018 Board of Directors,
https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/2018_board_of_directors.pd
f (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
71
INS. INFO. INST., How Much Homeowners Insurance Do I Need?,
https://www.iii.org/article/how-much-homeowners-insurance-do-you-need
(last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
72
INS. INFO. INST., Insurance for Your House and Personal Possessions:
Deciding How Much You Need, https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/
pdf/possessions.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
73
NAT’L ASS’N OF MORTG. BROKERS, About NAMB,
https://www.namb.org/about_namb.php. (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
74
E-mail from Valerie Saunders (Feb. 21, 2018) (on file with author).
75
Id.
76
Ronald J. Papa, Testimony of the National Association of Public
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There are companies that build and sell tools directly to insurance
companies for determining the cost to replace a particular property during
underwriting. These companies generate the tools as well as extensive
training videos and directions for agents as to how to use these tools. While
a consumer could buy the tool, that is not these companies’ target customer.
Their business model simply assumes it is the insurer who calculates
replacement cost when coverage determinations are made in the course of
selling or renewing insurance.77
Finally, of course, there are the consumers themselves. They tell the
same story repetitively – they relied on their agent to set coverage.78 As one
Insurance. Adjusters Before the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Property. and Casualty Insurance. (C) Committee Public
Hearing on Catastrophe Claims at 10, NAIC (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_related_hearing_testimony_
docs.pdf?160.
77
Verisk, 360Value, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/360val
ue-overview/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (“360Value helps property insurers
meet evolving customer expectations, while maintaining rating integrity.”);
CoreLogic, RCT Express: Risk Assessment and Valuation Platform,
https://www.corelogic.com/products/rct-express.aspx (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (“RCT Express delivers the reliable reconstruction cost estimating that
carriers have come to rely on for their new business and renewal
workflows.”).
78
See, e.g., ASS’N. OF CAL. INS. COS., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 56 (“I ask
about the $186,000 total if it was necessary for I was going to remodel my
kitchen. He told me with replacement costs built into my policy I would be
fine.”), 65 (“I had a conversation with my agent 3 months before the fires
about the possibility of being under insured....”), 80 (“After the Cedar fire
[sic] in San Diego I contacted my broker to increase my coverage.”), 100
(“Given the fact that my Agent stated that we were fully covered, I felt we
were indeed ‘in good hands’ and believed that, in the case of a total loss, we
would indeed have enough to fully replace our lost home.”), 175-76 (“I
contacted State Farm in the fall of 2004 and told Ms. Bowman that I was
concerned about being underinsured in the aftermath of the Cedar Fire.... Ms.
Bowman told me unequivocally that we had enough insurance coverage and
were fully protected.... At one point she used the phrase ‘buckets of money’
to describe the protection that the State Farm policy provided.”), 200 (“In
2003, after the Old Fire, I called Allstate to ask if my policy limits were
adequate in the event of a total loss.... I was told they were.... I called Allstate
again.... My policy limits were raised .... I was thoroughly reassured...that I
had ‘more than enough coverage’....”), 562 (“My husband said the amount
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homeowner wrote to the CDOI in 2008, “I assumed that the insurance agent
was an expert in determining the cost to rebuild my home based on the fact
that she is an insurance broker; insurance is her business in my
community.”79
Here is how the CDOI described essentially the same point in
briefing to the California Supreme Court:
[D]espite insurers’ attempts to place the responsibility to select
appropriate coverage limits on homeowners, homeowners in fact
relied on insurers’ estimates of replacement cost to determine the
amount of coverage to buy, and, as a result of insurers’ failure to
include all reasonable and necessary expenses in their estimates, a
large number of homeowners were underinsured…. “[T]he insurers’
processes and tools for estimating replacement cost are inadequate
for formulating a realistic dwelling rebuilding cost” and their use
“result[s] in insureds who believe they are adequately covered for
the full reconstruction cost of their dwelling….”80
United Policyholders filed an amicus brief with the California
Supreme Court, along with the neighborhood associations of two San Diego
neighborhoods devastated by two separate wildfires, summarizing what all
industry insiders have always known:
The vast majority of underinsured homeowner followed an agent or
insurer’s recommendations and purchased an amount of home
insurance that was based on a replacement estimate provided by
the agent or insurer. Insurance sales representatives routinely
perform a replacement estimate calculation and provide it to the
insured at the point of sale. They induce consumers to rely on their
professional expertise and consumers do so. Insurance sales
representatives advertise themselves as experts in protecting
people’s assets. That expertise and the quality of the protection…is
the essence of their sales pitch.81

seemed low, he offered to increase the insurance, and he questioned the
amount several times. The agent represented that the amount was enough to
replace the house.”).
79
Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 723.
80
Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No-S226529, 2014 WL 508598 at *11
(Cal. App. Feb. 5, 2014) (Appellant’s Opening Brief).
81
Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No. S226529 2014 WL 3428812 at
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There simply is no real dispute from the interested parties on all sides
– other than in a post natural disaster public relations or legal damage control
context82 – that a homeowner buys homeowner insurance on the basis of a
coverage recommendation given at the point of sale by the insurer or
insurer’s producer.83 Indeed, in the files of the CDOI, insurers routinely
acknowledge that at least historically, insurers or their producers were the
ones that estimated coverage limits.84
Of course, producers have at least two reasons to quote full coverage
limits. First, producers are paid on commission, and presumably know the
infrequency of customers price-shopping insurance. Second, intentionally
mis-describing and understating the adequacy of coverage exposes the
producer to liability.85 So, one would reasonably expect that in the majority
of instances, producers want to quote full coverage at whatever number the
producer actually thinks is ‘full’ RCV.86
*16-17 (Cal. App. July 10, 2014) (Amicus Brief of United Policyholders,
Scripps Ranch Civic Association, Rancho Bernardo Community Council in
Support of Defendant and Appellant) (emphasis in original).
82
Klein, supra note 3, at 364-65.
83
See, e.g., Hassani, supra note 2, at 151-72.
84
See, e.g., Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 74, 146, 154,
186, 196, 227, 323 (“The agent appears to have calculated coverage....”),
371, 411, 414 (“agency calculated...dwelling coverage limit ....”), 464 (“The
Coverage A limit was figured at policy inception. Over the years...I
figured....”), 520 (“With the information provided by the insured I used the
CAN replacement cost estimator to calculate the estimated coverage ....”),
562, 584, 689 (“My agency did not calculate the Coverage A amount. We
did, however, calculate an estimate ....”), 993-94.
85
For an overview of the complex set of regulations concerning duties
of producers, see UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, Links to Materials Produced in
the Agents E&O Standard of Care Project which was Commissioned by the
Big “I” Professional Liability Program and Swiss Re Corporate Solutions
(October
2016),
http://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/listing_of_big_i_swis
s_re_agents_standard_of_care_inform ation.pdf. It bears noting that through
the device of the insurable interest requirement, an insurer can limit the
amount paid to the actual replacement value even if the coverage exceeds
that amount. See Molk, supra note 11, at 360.
86
In 2008, the trade magazine, National Underwriter Property &
Casualty, asked its readers, “what producers and insurers should ethically do
to have properties properly insured;” it summarized the answers it got as,
“[V]ery few responding believed there was no ethical responsibility for
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And yet this leads to a conundrum – if a policyholder is willing to
buy ‘full’ coverage and a producer has a financial incentive to sell ‘full’
coverage then why is the estimated ‘full’ coverage so routinely low?
III.

HOW THE COST TO REBUILD A HOME IS ESTIMATED

Why are RCV coverage limits pervasively and profoundly
inadequate? The answer comes from knowing where the predicted ‘cost of
full replacement’ number comes from. And the answer to that question is
replacement cost estimating tools.87 To understand why coverage limits are
ubiquitously low, one must understand the tools.88
A.

THE COVERAGE ESTIMATING TOOLS

There are two companies – Verisk Analytics, Inc.89 and CoreLogic,
Inc. – that dominate the market of creating and selling to insurers software
90

producers to offer advice as to insurance-to-value. On the other hand, no one
claimed there was any legal duty to do so, either.” Peter R. Kensicki, Whose
Fault is it When Properties are Underinsured?, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP.
& CAS. (Apr. 27, 2008), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/04/27/
whose-fault-is-it-when-properties-are-underinsured/.
87
See, e.g., Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 464 (“The
Coverage A limit was figured at policy inception. Over the years in talking
with contractors, and seeing the typical replacement cost figures that the
Farmers system (which uses Marshall-Swift) would give me, I figured ....”),
520 (“With the information provided by the insured I used the CAN
replacement cost estimator to calculate the estimated coverage ....”), 689
(“My agency did not calculate the Coverage A amount. We did, however,
calculate an estimate using the Marshall & Swift/Boeckh tool State Farm
provided at the time.”). See also Id. at 1029 (“each insurer had its own
replacement cost estimating tool.”).
88
Hassani, supra note 2, at 33 (“valuation algorithms and methodologies
have routinely failed to generate accurate home reconstruction costs ...”).
89
Verisk began as the Insurance Services Office – the property and
casualty insurer trade organization – but now describes itself as, among other
things, “a leading data analytics provider serving customers in insurance ....”
Verisk, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Dec. 2, 2018).
90
CoreLogic self-describes itself as a “leading property information,
analytics and data-enabled services provider in North America ....”
CoreLogic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 3 (Feb. 24, 2017). According
to CoreLogic, central to CoreLogic’s ability to compete with Verisk as a
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to calculate appropriate homeowner insurance coverage limits. Between
them, they capture close to the entirety of the market.91 A third company –
e2Value – is a relatively recent market entrant trying to compete by doing
something largely different.92 For residential underwriting, Verisk’s
underwriting product is 360Value. CoreLogic’s underwriting product is
RCT. e2Value’s underwriting product is Pronto (a later generation trade
name of a sister-product, Mainstreet). The most straightforward way to
describe the three coverage estimating tools is to detail what 360Value does
and then to differentiate RCT and Pronto.
1. 360Value
Verisk describes 360Value as a tool for insurers – when
underwriting new insurance or renewing existing coverage -- for determining
the cost to rebuild a home: “From underwriting to policy renewal” 360Value
provides a “replacement cost estimation system to generate reliable estimates
provider of tools for estimating rebuilding costs is that CoreLogic acquired
Marshall & Swift/Boeckh in March of 2015. Id. at 79. MSB, which
CoreLogic headlines as “the gold standard of building cost data,” is
described by CoreLogic as having “80 years of experience ... ensuring users
have the tools for a complete and defendable determination of value.”
CoreLogic, Marshall & Swift: The Gold Standard of Building Cost Data,
http://www.corelogic.com/solutions/marshall-swift.aspx (last visited Apr. 2,
2018).
91
E-mail from Guy Kopperud to Ken Klein (Mar. 22, 2018, 9:20 PST)
(on file with author). Verisk says its decision analytics customers are “the
majority of the P&C insurers in the U.S.” Verisk Analytics, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Feb. 20, 2018). Accord Collier & Ragin, supra
note 61, at 7 (“Out of the eight [insurers identifying] their replacement cost
software, six currently use Marshall & Swift ...”). According to its cofounder, e2Value’s market share as measured by percentage of insurer
entities in the U.S. (~1500) is about a third, but as measured by written
premium would not be nearly that. e2Value’s market share has a higher
penetration in high-value insured properties. E-mail from Todd Rissel to Ken
Klein (May 2, 2018).
92
e2Value is a private company formed in 2000 by George Moore and
Todd Rissel. Company, E2VALUE, http://e2value.com/coompany (last
visited Mar. 1, 2018). On May 13, 2008, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office issued Patent No. 7,373,303 to Moore and Rissel for a
method and system for “estimating building reconstruction costs.” U.S.
Patent No. 7,373,303, at [21] (issued May 13, 2008).

60

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 25

for every property….”93 And per Verisk, a lot of insurers use it: “Insurers
already use 360Value to conduct almost 50% of all property replacement
cost estimates in the United States…. 360Value is becoming the most widely
used reconstruction cost estimator in the United States.”94 For these 50% of
all U.S. property replacement cost estimates, Verisk makes a promise: using
360Value, there will be “no surprises for underwriters or policyholders in the
event of a total loss.”95
360Value seeks to deliver on Verisk’s promise by leveraging
Verisk’s existing data and tools for claims adjusting. The data and tools
primarily are those of Xactware Solutions, Inc. Xactware is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Verisk.96 Verisk represents that Xactware is “a leading supplier
of estimation software for professionals involved in building repair and
reconstruction.”97 360Value starts with Xactware’s database, and massages
the numbers to account for some variables such as rising building costs over
time98 and demand surge in the wake of natural disaster99, and thus derives
an estimated cost to replace for purposes of underwriting at the time of
selling insurance or revisiting coverage limits at the time of renewal. Or in
the words of Verisk, 360Value is designed to “match the front end to the
back end.”100
But while 360Value utilizes a variety of data sources (the delineated
data sources are “public records, global information system (GIS) data,
existing underwriting and claims estimates, [and] regional modeling”),101
fundamentally 360Value is reliant upon Xactware’s data and technology,
which Verisk describes as, “The key to the accuracy and reliability of 360

93

VERISK, 360VALUE 3 (2016), https://www.verisk/com/siteassets/medi
a/underwriting-v/resources/360value-overview.pdf.
94
Id. at 2. This is a serious encroachment on the market share of MSB,
which as recently as 2006 was described as having a monopoly position.
Elliot Spagat, Insurance Calculator Questioned: Homeowners Discover
Coverage Was Insufficient, WASH. POST, at G3 (July 24, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9509-2004Jul23.html?n
oredirect=on.
95
VERISK, supra note 93, at 8.
96
VERISK, supra note 91, at 112.
97
VERISK, supra note 91, at 5.
98
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
99
VERISK, 360Value Overview, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/prod
ucts/360value-overview/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
100
VERISK, supra note 93, at 8.
101
VERISK, supra note 93, at 5.
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Value estimates….”102 That ‘data and technology’ set comes from claims
adjusting – it is “Xactimate, Xactware’s industry-leading claims estimation
solution.”103 That is an extensive set, because 360Value claims Xactimate is
used by “80 percent of insurance repair contractors” and “22 of the top 25
U.S. property insurers.”104 As Verisk brags, 360Value uses “true componentbased replacement cost estimates based on actual claims information…. This
true component-based approach…is what sets 360Value apart from other
cost-estimating tools.”105
So, what is Xactimate? Xactimate is aptly described by an Xactimate
Affiliate Trainer, Mark Whatley:
Xactimate gives users access to pricing databases for 468 distinct
markets throughout the United States and Canada. Xactware
publishes and maintains these price lists for both structural repair and
cleaning, updating them at least once per quarter.
Each structural repair and cleaning database contains more than
19,500 unit-cost line items. For each line item, Xactimate provides:
• Labor costs
• Labor productivity rates (for new construction and restoration)
• Labor burden and overhead
• Material costs
• Equipment costs
• Contents replacement cost value
The Xactimate price lists seek to contemplate the costs to perform
various activities within the confines of the restoration ecosystem.
e.g., storage, contents packouts & restoration, mold remediation,
water extraction, environmental testing, asbestos abatement, etc.
In most regions, a new price list is generated monthly. This updated
price list incorporates ~10 new line items and significant
modifications to an additional ~30 line items. Traditionally, user
feedback is the catalyst for the adoption of new line items and
material updates.106

102

VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
104
VERISK, supra note 93, at 8.
105
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
106
Mark Whatley, Xactimate: The History & The Future, ACTIONABLE
INSIGHTS 2 (Apr. 2018), https://www.getinsights.org/xactimate-historyfuture/.
103
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To understand Xactimate, and in turn Xactware, and in turn
360Value, it is of immense importance to understand precisely where the
foundational price data comes from, because it is not simply a download of
the prices charged by a big box construction supply store such as Home
Depot or Lowe’s. Xactimate is the self-described “industry leading” tool for
claims adjusting.107 And the raw data for the “industry leading” tool largely
is the aggregated data from billions of line items from previously adjusted
claims.108
That, in a nutshell, is how 360Value works. Billions of lines of data
are aggregated from millions of adjusted claims. That data is combined with
localized retail price data as well as a database of construction contracts
emerging from those claims negotiations. The claims data then is updated
quarterly,109 monthly,110 or even more frequently as needed,111 and for
purposes of 360Value is combined with weather and other predictive
software to incorporate unusual risk factors.112 And this then all results in a
tool that a producer can use to estimate rebuild costs in order to determine
coverage limits and premium. Essentially, used properly, 360Value prices
the hypothetical reconstruction of a house down to its nails and screws.113
But that takes a lot of time. Time a producer may not have.114
According to Verisk’s literature, “360Value can calculate residential
building estimates with as little as the address, year built, and total finished
square footage.”115 Additionally, “360Value gives you the option of selecting
107

VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
Whatley, supra note 104, at 13; XACTWARE, Pricing Data Services,
https://www.xactware.com/en-us/resources/pricing-data-services/overview/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018). For a great more detail on the Xactware approach
to data analytics generating a price list, see XACTWARE, Pricing Research
Methodology
(Feb.
6,
2018),
https://www.xactware.com/globalassets/us/pdf/brochures/pricing-researchmethodology.pdf.
109
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
110
Whatley, supra note 106, at 2.
111
See California Wildfires – Xactware Support, XACTWARE,
https://www.
xactware.com/enus/support/california-wildfires/.
112
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3-6.
113
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3-6.
114
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1217 (“Many producers generate hundreds of
quotes per week.”).
115
VERISK, supra note 93, at 3.
108
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a quality grade for either the entire property or specific rooms….”116 An
insurer can also simply enter an address and 360Value will pre-fill up to 65
characteristics of a home.117
2. RCT
CoreLogic’s product is RCT (“RCT Express” as an ‘app’).118 As
CoreLogic describes its product:
We’ve spent the last eight decades perfecting our total component
methodology. This unique estimating methodology researches
building costs from the ground up, with unparalleled research into
local labor, materials and equipment costs in more than 750
independent regions. We research more than 100,000 construction
line items; 90 labor trades; and construction crew sizes, productivity,
soft costs and code variations to give you consistent and current cost
information. We validate our estimates with local and national
research, home surveys, contractor estimates, construction samples
and insurance loss analysis. In addition, we get inputs from design
firms, architects, universities and construction organizations.119
We localize costs at the micro-economic level and score property
characteristics for reliability based on age, completeness and
accuracy with our proprietary algorithms. Then, we use those
property characteristics to provide more accurate risk values to give
you a deeper understanding of residential structural risk, building
condition and contents.120
Benefits include: One-step estimating and risk assessment.121
RCT sounds a lot like 360Value, and in the largest sense – a price
list, data base, component-based estimating system – it is. There is one
significant difference, however. RCT is not primarily using claims adjusted

116

VERISK, supra note 93, at 3
VERISK, supra note 93, at 5.
118
See generally CoreLogic, supra note 77.
119
Structural Risk and Valuation, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.c
om/solutions/structural-risk-andvaluation-solutions.aspx (last visited April
2, 2018).
120
Id.
121
RCT Express, CORELOGIC, http://www.corelogic.com/downloadable
-docs/rct-express.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
117
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contracts and prices in its data; rather, RCT primarily is using retail price
data.122
3. Pronto
As alluded to above, in some ways Pronto is a horse of a different
color. Pronto draws upon “public and private data sources” including the
company’s “own deep data” “to ensure…property estimates are as accurate
as possible.”123
e2Value starts from a different premise than Verisk or CoreLogic.
e2Value believes that the predominant drivers of replacement cost are where
a house will be built and what the quality/prestige expectations of builders
for that neighborhood are.124 Stated differently, the cost of building the same
house in Flint, Michigan, in Detroit, Michigan, and in Grosse Pointe,
Michigan will vastly differ even though all three builders have access to the
same labor and materials markets. Pronto is based on algorithms that analyze
data on the premise that this dimension is far more predictive of accurate
costs than detailed component-based price lists.125
Like 360Value and RCT, “Pronto allows…customers to access a
comprehensive valuation report instantly, after inputting only the property’s
address.”126
B.

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COVERAGE ESTIMATING TOOLS

360Value, RCT, and Pronto are very sophisticated tools for
estimating replacement costs of homes when underwriting insurance, and yet
unwitting underinsurance persists. Why does it happen? The short answer is
that fundamentally it is impossible to precisely predict a future rebuild cost.
The longer answer looks at the architecture of replacement cost estimating
tools, and the human factors of the people using those tools. The software
designs make understating of risk possible and the human factors make
understating risk likely.

122

E-mail from Guy Kopperud to Ken Klein, Professor of L., Cal.W.
Sch. of L. (Apr. 5, 2018).
123
About Us, E2VALUE, http://e2Value.com/us/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2018).
124
Email from Todd Rissel to Ken Klein, Professor of L., Cal.W. Sch.
of L. (Mar. 3, 2018).
125
Id.
126
e2Value, supra note 123.
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But before detailing of these systemic and human factors, there is a
caveat: As to any of these systemic or human factors, one could posit that
they are unlikely or purely theoretical, or that the impact of them is small or
not at all. But if all of these factors were of little influence then certainly
extended replacement coverage creating a 25%, 50%, 100%, or even 150%
fudge factor or buffer would be sufficient to prevent underinsurance, and yet
time and again it is not.127 The CDOI’s market conduct examinations of
insurers found that the tools used by insurers were “inadequate for
formulating a realistic dwelling rebuilding cost.”128 In other words, the
estimates often did not come close.
1. Systemic Architecture of Replacement Cost Estimating
a.

shortcuts

As described above, all three estimating tools – 360Value, RCT, and
Pronto – allow estimating to be done with very little information, sometimes
just a street address, or an address plus the age of home and its square
footage. But in estimating, shortcuts are a problem.
As two Assistant Vice-Presidents of Xactware describe, if the goal
is accuracy:
Estimates are calculated by entering all known property-specific
building attributes…. The property-specific building attributes drive
all system assumptions and the subsequent components used to
calculate the estimate. The quantity and quality of this information
will influence reliability of the estimate…. The more building
attributes used, the more reliable the replacement-cost estimate.129
For component-based programs (RCT and 360Value),
“Replacement-cost estimators depend on the underlying labor and material
component costs that serve as building blocks for the estimate. To ensure
127

Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1027-30.
128
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1030.
129
Scott Amussen & Mike Fulton, A Balancing Act: Homeowners
writers strive for underwriting efficiency without sacrificing reliable
replacement-cost estimates, BEST’S REV. 1, 2 (Nov. 2010)
https://www.xactware.com/globalassets/us/pdf/360value/bests-review-nov2
010-property-attributes.pdf.
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accuracy, these components must be comprehensive, accounting for all
permutations and combinations of features possible in a given structure.”130
The following language from the ‘303 patent (the patent underlying
Pronto) is instructive:
Attempts have been made to simplify the methodology for
estimating construction costs. U.S. Pat. No. 5,546,564 to Horie
proposes a construction cost estimating system in which a database
of completed construction projects is maintained with cost data for
each project and other data for sorting the projects for relevance to a
particular
proposed
new
project….
This technique, however, is subject to substantial inaccuracy due to
the effects of its simplifying assumptions. …there are a great many
cost influences that will vary from project to project, thus making it
impractical to assess the relevance of any given project to another.131
But Pronto is not immune from the problem either. As Todd Rissel
(one of the two founders of e2Value) describes, while Pronto strives for and
claims to achieve accurate estimating within 2.5% of actual cost to replace,
failure to put in the detail of a property as actually built – for example,
whether the roof cover is clay tile vs. asphalt shingle – can cause
discrepancies (per Rissel) of up to 15%.132
What is odd and difficult to explain is that shortcuts seem to lead
disproportionately to understating valuation. In the wake of the 2003 Cedar
Fire, the allegation was made that the shortcut function in the MSB software
led to dramatic underinsurance.133 The same seems to be the experience
today with 360Value.134 And while of course it is difficult to draw too much
from these data points because there is no reason to hear complaints when
the estimate either is accurate or high, the natural experiments described
130

Id.
U.S. Patent Application No. 10/013,428, Publication No.
2008/0103991 A1 (published May 1, 2008) (George C. Moore & Todd
Rissel, applicants).
132
Email from Todd Rissel to Ken Klein dated March 2, 2018.
133
See, e.g., Jeanette Steele, Coverage gap in rebuilding linked to cost
calculators, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Aug. 22, 2004),
http://www.carehelp.org/files/News/20040822_Coverage_gap_in_rebuildin
g_linked_to_cost_calculators.pdf.
134
See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Bivin v. United
Services Automobile Association, No. SCV-261717 (Super. Ct. of the State
of Cal. For the Cty. of Sonoma Dec. 21, 2017).
131
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below suggest that in fact, shortcuts tend disproportionately to lead to low
estimates.
Finally, it bears noting that while the shortcut function presumably
could be removed from the software, it is not.135
b.

timing

As the Insurance Information Institute recognizes, “If the limits of
your policy haven’t changed since you bought your home, then you’re
probably underinsured.”136 There are at least two potential causes – in the
absence of extraordinary events – of coverage adequacy deterioration even
in a single policy year – inflating building costs and building code changes.
Even in the absence of ordinary inflation “materials prices and labor
rates change constantly.”137 Historically, the change is in only one direction
– up. As Verisk explains about 360Value, “To incorporate the most current
changes in reconstruction material and labor costs, the Xactware team
updates reconstruction cost data quarterly.”138 Verisk then publishes every
fiscal quarter a “360Value Quarterly Cost Update” on construction costs.139
The Verisk library of quarterly reports begins with Q3 2011 (which reports
on Q2 2011)140 and thus far runs through Q1 2018 (which does not give a
quarterly figure for Q4 2017;141 the last reported quarterly figure thus far is
for Q3 2017).142 For all but one of these 26 of these reported quarters, each
135

A company designing the software might hesitate to remove the
shortcut feature for fear that it would be economically unsustainable for an
insurer or producer to do full, detailed cost estimates.
136
INS. INFO. INST., supra note, 72 at 4.
137
Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1-2.
138
VERISK, supra note 92, at 3.
139
VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Updates, https://www.verisk.com/
insurance/campaigns/360value-quarterly-cost-updates/, (last visited Mar. 7,
2018).
140
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q3 2011, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-cost-update-us-2011-q3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2018).
141
VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2018,
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu
e-quarterly/q1_2018_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
142
VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q4 2017,
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu
e-quarterly/360value_quarterly_cost_update_q4_2017.pdf (last visited Mar.
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and every quarter, construction costs have increased. The one exception –
Q1 2014 – costs are reported as “virtually unchanged.”143 Costs never fall.
And annually, costs are reported as rising 1.09% in 2011,144 2.02% in
2012,145 3% in 2013,146 4.3% in 2014,147 2.2% in 2015,148 2.4% in 2016,149
and 5% in 2017.150 Put another way, for every year since 2012, the rate of
construction cost increase has exceeded the annual rate of general
inflation.151 As a consequence, the coverage limit to rebuild a home is fixed
7, 2018).
143
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q2 2017, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q2_2014_usa.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
144
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q1 2012, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-cost-update-us-2012-q1.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2018).
145
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q1 2013, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost_update_q1_2013_usa.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
146
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q1 2014, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q1_2014_usa.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
147
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q1 2015, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q1_2015_usa.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
148
VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost
Changes Q1 2016, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwritingv/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-q1-2016_usa.pdf (last visited Mar.
7, 2018).
149
VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2017,
https://www.verisk.com/
siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-q12017_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
150
VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2018,
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu
e-quarterly/q1_2018_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
151
Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2018, US INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/
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for the entire coverage year, but the actual rebuild cost goes up every day of
the coverage year.
A similar problem arises with changing building codes. As I.I.I.
explains, “In the event of damage, you may be required to rebuild your home
to the new codes….”152 Changes to the building codes making construction
costs rise are so ubiquitous, in fact, that the I.I.I. recommends a rider to
insurance for these costs.153
For both of these reasons – building codes and building costs – even
within a single policy year and certainly over the span of several years, the
accuracy and adequacy of estimated replacement cost erodes.
Insurers could adjust annually for these factors. They often do not.
c.

predicting catastrophe

Catastrophes raise costs. The mechanics of this are simple – the
construction trades build to expected capacity, and a mass loss in the wake
of a natural disaster causes a demand surge.154
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018); accord Whatley, supra note 106, at 2.
152
INS. INFO. INST., supra note 71. See also John Caulfield, Are Building
Codes Revised Too Often?, BUILDER MAGAZINE (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.builderonline.com/building/code/are-building-codes-revised-to
o-often_o (“In many states, building codes are reviewed and revised every
three years.”). See also Do’s And Don’ts When Insuring Your Home,
UNITED POLICYHOLDERS https://www.uphelp.org/pubs/dos-and-dontswhen-insuring-your-home (“Make sure your offers adequate coverage for
building code upgrades. The safest bet is full building code upgrade
coverage, which is available from companies such as Fireman’s Fund,
Safeco, Chubb, and Allied. Most other insurers offer either an extra 10% for
building coverage or a flat $25,000.”). See also Why You Need Building Code
Upgrade Coverage, GALLI INSURANCE AGENCY, http://www.galliinsurance
.com/why-you-need-building-code-upgrade-coverage/.
153
Id.
154
Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1–2 (“Many factors influence
[rebuild] costs, including...demand surge following a catastrophe....”). See
also Will multiple catastrophes impact costs?, E2VALUE (Nov. 22, 2017),
http://e2value.com/blog/insurance/will-multiple-catastrophes-impact-costs/;
Labor shortages still a concern for builders, E2VALUE (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://e2value.com/blog/general-information/labor-shortages-still-a-concern
-for-builders/; Michael Gannon, Hurricane Sandy Demand Surge Influences
Replacement Cost Estimates in the Northeast, VERISK (Feb. 13, 2013),
https://www.verisk.com/blog/hurricane-sandy-demand-surge-influences-
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Demand surge is a complex economic consequence to model, but
accurately doing so is of immense importance to insurers.155 To simply
illustrate the issue more concretely, consider concrete. The industry
populates inventory, labor, and schedule capacity to anticipated normal
construction demand supply – there are not trucks and workers and concrete
just lying around waiting for the next hurricane or fire or flood. So, when
those weather events do happen, demand spikes, and in turn prices spike
too.156
The insurance industry is well aware of the importance of tracking
and understanding the potential impact of natural disasters.157 More to the
point, however, is that Verisk, CoreLogic, and e2Value all recognize the
importance of accounting for natural catastrophe and attendant demand surge
in order to properly estimate needed coverage to rebuild a lost home.158
replacement-cost-estimates-in-the-northeast/.
155
See David Döhrmann, Marc Gürtler & Martin Hibbeln, Insured Loss
Inflation: How Natural Catastrophes Affect Reconstruction Costs, 84 J. RISK
& INS. 851 (2017).
156
E-mail from Sean Scott to Kenneth S. Klein, Professor of Law, Louis
& Hermione Brown Professor in Preventative Law, (April 09, 2018, 19:15
PST) (on file with author). (“To meet the demand, some contractors may
bring in or construct their own ‘batch plants’, which are miniature concrete
plants that can be set up on a small plot of ground to produce concrete for a
tract of homes or larger construction projects. These are not cheap to set up
or operate but are often used to help meet demand. Another example of
demand surge wreaking havoc was when drywall was imported by the
United States from China during the construction boom between 2004 and
2007. This was spurred by a shortage of American-made drywall due to the
rebuilding demand of nine hurricanes that hit Florida from 2004 to 2005, and
widespread damage caused along the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina in
2005.... [I]t is safe to say that all construction related materials and labor are
affected by disasters, especially in and around the immediate affected
areas.”) And this assumes, of course, that there are architects and general
contractors who are available, and that they do not have to depend upon
unlicensed, pirate subs, and trades to do work.
157
See, e.g., Background on: Wildfires, INS. INFO. INST., (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.iii.org/issue-update/background-on-wildfires;
Arindam
Samanta, Key Findings From the 2017 Verisk Wildfire Risk Analysis,
VERISK (July 12, 2017), https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/keyfindings-from-the-2017-verisk-wildfire-risk-analysis/?utm_source=Social&
utm_medium=Twitter&utm_campaign=VeriskSM&utm_content=842017.
158
See, e.g., VERISK, supra note 93, at 6 (“Because many of the data
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Improperly accounted for demand surge causes massive underinsurance in
the event of total loss.
d.

feedback loops

360Value and RCT are “component-based” estimating tools. The
essence of component-based estimating is in its name – line item
components. As Verisk asserts, 360Value “accounts for all labor and
material costs down to the screws and nails.”159 Feedback loops create
averages, and averages will often be low.
Consider, for example, the approach of 360Value, which estimates
by reference to contracts adjusted in the claims process.160 In claims
elements needed for replacement cost estimates are the same elements
needed for catastrophe modeling, 360Value is ideally suited to capture the
detailed, property-specific data needed for effective catastrophe analysis.
The point in the underwriting process when replacement cost is reviewed
may also be an ideal opportunity to check on catastrophe risk.”); Trish
Hopkinson, Hurricanes Drive Demand Surge in Reconstruction Costs (Nov.
7, 2017), https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/hurricanes-drivedemand-surge-in-reconstruction-costs/; Store-Specific Demand Surge from
Severe Weather, VERISK, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/respo
nd-weather-analytics-to-predict-demand/store-specific-demand-surge-algor
ithms/ (last visited April 2, 2018); Anthony Hanson, What Demand Surge
Might Look Like in This Year’s Hurricane Season, VERISK, (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/what-demand-surge-might-loo
k-like-in-this-year-s-hurricane-season/; Will multiple catastrophes impact
costs? E2VALUE, (Nov. 22, 2017), http://e2value.com/blog/insurance/willmultiple-catastrophes-impact-costs/; CoreLogic Introduces New Desktop
Platform for Insurance Providers to Pinpoint Natural Hazard Risk and Tax
Data, CORELOGIC, (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.corelogic.com/news/corelo
gic-introduces-new-desktop-platform-for-insurance-providers-to-pinpointnatural-hazard-risk-and-tax-data.aspx; Assess Natural Hazard Risk n RCT
Express, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.com/products/natural-hazardsrct-express.aspx (last visited April 2, 2018); Hazard HQ, CORELOGIC,
https://www.corelogic.com/landing-pages/hazard-hq.aspx?WT.mc_id=crlg
_180813_yVEsA (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). While all the software claim
to account for demand surge, there is no disclosure of how this is done.
159
VERISK, 360Value, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/360
value-residential/ (last visited April 2, 2018).
160
See Whatley, supra note 106, at 5 (“More than 400,000 estimates are
returned to Xactware every day....”), 13 (“Xactware’s Pricing Data Service
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adjusting Xactware functions as a cost containment tool.161 If functioning
properly, Xactware will materially ‘contain’ line item prices. That, per force,
depresses the price list used in underwriting estimating.
As an illustration, assume a homeowner has lost their home and is
trying to rebuild. They have a contractor who has made a detailed bid. One
line-item of the bid is 1000 widgets. A widget is priced in the database price
for $1.00. But the actual price of a widget is $1.05. The insurance adjuster
will challenge the line item of any contractor bid that prices the 1000 widgets
above $1000.
Because the contractor is unlikely to complete the work at a loss,
they have some choices: They can walk away; they can turn to the
homeowner for the difference; they perhaps can find some other line item –
let’s say 50 zoobles – that they have a source to get for under list price and
thus make up the loss on the widgets; or they can negotiate to try to get more
for widgets.162 In all likelihood, the contractor will do some combination of
more than one of these strategies.
But under any scenario, the contractor has an incentive to have the
line item for the 1000 widgets be at or as close as possible to $1000.163
…reports cost information based upon actual prices and transactions
(completed bids) that have occurred recently in the given market.”);
Xactware, supra note 108, at 7 (“Xactware’s role is to report a market price
based upon recent transactions that have occurred.”).
161
Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“[O]ver the last decade, there has been
a substantial increase in the frequency with which independent and Staff
Adjusters write their own estimates.... [T]his change in policy has likely had
a significant impact as it relates to stagnant pricing within the Xactimate
price lists.... Why? Those that are operating under the direction of...insurance
executives are trained to...(B) Apply a carrier centric custom price list that is
comprised of suppressed pricing and a limited number of items....
In…Scenario “B”, the custom carrier centric price list actually actively
works to suppress reimbursement rates for policyholders.”), 4 (“Staff
adjusters submitted 63.1 percent of estimates processed by XactAnalysis in
2016.”).
162
In the event that the contractor engages in negotiation, there is the
additional problem of asymmetrical expertise and bargaining power between
the contractor and the insurer. Id. at 8-10.
163
The contractor views the adjuster as a volume buyer and so faces
immense pressure to “give” in the negotiation. SEAN M. SCOTT, SECRETS OF
THE INSURANCE GAME: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PROPERTY
DAMAGE CLAIMS 47-48 (Heritage 2017) (“…there are too many contractors
out there who are willing to drop their pants to get on an approved vendor
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Indeed, it may ultimately be exactly $1000 – the data base price.164
Let’s assume that the adjuster ultimately agrees to a price of widgets
at $1.01 a widget. That becomes the next real-time entry for a widget in the
database. And the algorithm of the database will not simply adopt the most
recent entry as controlling – it will incorporate the new entry with other
entries, so the price now listed in the data base may move only somewhat up
– let’s say it moves to $1.005 per widget. Remember – in our example the
actual current price of a widget is $1.05.165
The point here is simple. Feedback loops will average together all
prices -- including actual prices, stale prices, and below-market prices -- thus
creating the risk both of understating prices and price stagnation.166 And
using Xactware in particular as the core of 360Value amplifies the problem
because there also are many inevitable soft line item costs to actual
reconstruction – such as supervisor and project management time – that
adjusters “often claim they don’t pay for,”167 and each time that assertion
succeeds it may yet further depress any 360Value estimate that relies in part
on that adjusted contract.
2. Human Factors Leading to Software Misuse
Software with all of the above-described features and challenges will
function no better than the people who use it. And in cost-estimating, that’s
a problem.

program with an insurance company. Many become mesmerized with the
idea that doing so will be the key to fame and fortune and a larger volume of
work. This mindset is similar to the lure of gambling where you get a taste
of winning a couple of hands, but in the end, the odds of beating the house
are always stacked against you.”).
164
See Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“It is incredibly easy for ... major
insurance institutions to exercise their will against the boilerplate price list
(either intentionally or unintentionally)…. Contractors are rarely taking the
time to determine their own individual cost, and subsequently create a
custom price list that reflects their unique cost of doing business.”).
165
See Kabir Shaal, Job Estimating Programs, LINKEDIN, (April 23,
2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/job-estimating-programs-kabir-shaa
l/ (“The software providers are very, very clear on one thing: Their calculated
pricelists are indicators, not absolute. They do not claim to offer the ‘right’
price.”).
166
Whatley, supra note 106, at 3-5.
167
Whatley, supra note 106, at 14.
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point of sale incentives

According to Verisk’s people, “Insurers strive for reliable estimates
but are mindful of the time required to calculate them.”168 A Texas insurance
agent candidly disagrees:
One way an agent can keep the price down is aim low [sic] in valuing
houses. The goal, they say, is to keep premiums down to keep
customers from going to competitors, and sometimes even a few
dollars can make a difference. Sadly, many agents are just plain lazy!
Too lazy to gather all the necessary information to accurately
determine the cost to rebuild a home.169
Perhaps laziness is a real problem. But more likely it is simple
economics. Only about five percent of homes change hands in any given
year.170 Put another way, homeowner insurance is a relatively mature market
– there may be little gain to investing time and effort into placing new
business. Yet, correctly calculating coverage limits accurately takes time171
– time that producers have little incentive to invest:
Insurers face competitive pressures to underwrite policies, requiring
companies to increase the speed and ease of doing business with
agents and streamline underwriting…. This poses a challenge for
insurers: How much data should be collected to ensure properties are
adequately insured and policyholders are protected, while remaining
sensitive to the time investment of the insurance representative and
policyholder?172

168

Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1; accord Papa, supra note 76,

at 10.
Rahim Virani, Under-Insured? – Part 3, TEXAN INSURANCE (Jan. 23,
2012), http://www.texaninsurance.com/client-service/blog/entryid/2860/un
der-insured-part-3 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018); see also Jerry Ramsey & Brian
Heffernan, Underinsurance: A Consumer Fraud, Not an Agent Error or
Omission, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, 8-10, http://uphelp.org/sites/default/fil
es/underinsurancelaws.pdf.
170
Klein, supra note 3, at 356.
171
See generally Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129.
172
Id. at 1-2; accord Tom Smith, The Value of Insurance-to-Value Often
Overlooked, INS. J. (Feb. 20, 2006), https://www.insurancejournal.com/mag
azines/mag-features/2006/02/20/67985.htm ([T]here often are not many
169
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expertise

Estimating accurately is technical173 – Xactimate, for example, has
four levels of user certification describing a spectrum of proficiency. 174 As
an analogy, think of the difference between a competent store clerk
deploying basic arithmetic to sum up a bill versus a mechanical engineer who
has mastered higher level mathematics to make sure the bridge doesn’t fall.
Both are doing math, but there’s a big difference in proficiency with
complexity. Whatley describes the following example: Xactimate is
excellent at assigning fair reimbursement for granite countertops, provided
that the detail is given as to “the proper grade of granite and all of the other
related costs are accounted for,” such as the work involved with light
switches embedded in the back splash or the inset of the sink or the mitering
of the corners.175 Lack of proficiency, lack of rigor, and lack of detail all
cause the claims adjustment to be low.176
There is no reason to expect that either RCT or Pronto, used
correctly, is materially easier. Indeed, both CoreLogic and e2Value provide
extensive resources to train insurance personnel to use their tools
accurately.177
Producers, even with training, may lack the expertise to properly use
cost estimators. But proper training is of little value if the producer does not
personally visit the property and do a several hour inspection.
In the absence of a visual inspection by a producer with time and
expertise, the adequacy of the estimate erodes. When getting estimated
incentives for agents and brokers to calculate accurate property and business
interruption (BI) values. As higher insurance values can mean higher
premiums, agents and brokers are obviously looking to keep premiums as
low as possible for their clients, which can affect their assessment of ITV.”).
173
See Amicus Brief of United Policyholders, et al., supra note 81, at
*
15.
174
Whatley, supra note 106, at 8.
175
Whatley, supra note 106, at 16-17.
176
Whatley, supra note 106, at 9; Hassani, supra note 2, at 63-66.
Insurers as well as producers support the notion that training is necessary to
get estimation right. See, e.g., Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL.
CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 1129-30, 1147, 1156,1186,
1198-99.
177
See CORELOGIC, RCT Express: Platform Overview,
https://www.corelogic.com/products/rct-express.aspx (touting online videos
and materials, private training, and on-site training); E2VALUE, Help Center,
https://evs.e2value.com/evs/est/InteractiveHelpAdmin/Glossary.aspx?;
E2VALUE, Online University, http://www.e2valueuniversity.com.
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replacement cost quotes questions should be asked on a variety of matters
such as are finishes above average or expensive; or is the exterior style
Spanish Modern or California Ranch; or the angle of slope of one’s roof; or
whether the slope of one’s land is mild or moderate. Often these questions
are asked directly to the homeowner. These are judgment calls for which
there is not always an objectively correct answer, and/or for which the
homeowner is insufficiently knowledgeable to answer accurately.
Differences in the answers to these questions, however, can profoundly
change the estimated replacement cost. That is particularly troublesome
because there is subtle psychological pressure on a homeowner to answer
questions in a way that results in lower-priced insurance.
c.

renewal incentives

All of the factors described above can cause the estimated
replacement cost to be understated even in a single policy year. But the
reality is that most insurance is in place as a renewed policy, not a new
policy, and so the challenges of underinsurance exacerbate.
For producers paid in commissions on premiums written, the lion’s
share of the money to be made is on renewals, not on selling new policies.
Renewals should be easy, because customers have inertia, and so are less
price elastic.178 But a producer nonetheless may hesitate to cause that
customer to wonder if the customer might be able to get the product cheaper
-- and thus to price shop it – by getting a renewal notice significantly raising
the premium.179
Now for these purposes it does not matter if the customer is price
elastic; all that matters is that the producer is concerned that the customer
might be price elastic. This is sufficient to incentivize the producer to not
refresh or revisit the estimate of replacement cost, because if the cost has
gone up (and remember, as Verisk’s data documents, the cost always is going
up), then the premium for the renewed policy will go up, and the producer
178

See Sydnor, supra note 63, at 184; accord Benjamin R. Handel &
Jonathan T. Kolstad, Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information
Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2449
(2015) (confirming the influence on hassle and inertia on insurance
decisions).
179
Caitlin Johnson, Most Homeowners Are Underinsured, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 31, 2006, 11:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mosthomeowners-are-underinsured/ (“In the competitive marketplace, the last
thing an agent wants is for the customer to run down the street to a competitor
because they got a quote for $50 a year less.”).
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will be at risk of losing the customer (and the commission). So, whatever
price stagnation exists at the outset, it will worsen over time. Every year that
a policy renews without revisiting the estimated replacement cost of the
dwelling, the worse underinsurance gets.
A final observation bears noting about underwriting – all of this
assumes internal insurance personnel are acting in good faith, yet in auto
insurance there is at least one prominently reported example of an insurer
quite intentionally setting up systems to increase its profits to the derogation
of its policyholders.180 And in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm
was found guilty of falsifying engineering reports in an attempt to evade
coverage.181 This Article does not seek to account for this sort of ‘cheating,’
but is not blind to its possibility.182

180

See, e.g., Steven Gursten, Allstate Confesses to Using Computer
Program to Reduce Settlements for Auto Accident Victims in Michigan,
Michigan Auto Law (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.michiganautolaw.com/
blog/2011/03/24/allstate-confesses-to-using-computer-program-to-reducesettlements-for-auto-accident-victims-in-michigan/.
181
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct.
436, 441 (2016) (“Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby are former claims
adjusters for one of petitioner’s contractors, E.A. Renfroe & Co. Together
with other adjusters, they were responsible for visiting the damaged homes
of petitioner’s customers to determine the extent to which a homeowner was
entitled to an insurance payout. According to respondents, petitioner
instructed them and other adjusters to misclassify wind damage as flood
damage in order to shift petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government.”)
and Associated Press, Jury Finds State Farm Committed Fraud, JACKSON
FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2013, 10:46 A.M), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/
news/2013/apr/09/jury-finds-state-farm-committed-fraud/.
182
See Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“It is incredibly easy for … major
insurance institutions to exercise their will against the boilerplate price list
(either intentionally or unintentionally).”), 8 (“Xactimate is a tool – a tool
that can be used for good or evil.”), & 11 (“A paradigm shift occurred in
1992 when Allstate and other major carriers hired McKinsey & Company to
develop strategies for managing claim cost. McKinsey referred to the claims
settlement process as a ‘zero-sum game’ - essentially the carrier and the
policyholder are competing for the same resources. The idea that an
Adjuster’s primary objective was to fairly distribute claims benefits was an
archaic notion, and the McKinsey report advised that claims be settled on a
take-it-or-litigate-it basis. As a result, Allstate moved from ‘Good Hands’ to
‘Boxing Gloves.’”).
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IV.

TWO NATURAL EXPERIMENTS (COLLECTED ANECDOTES) ON
ESTIMATING FULL REPLACEMENT COSTS

What the foregoing all predicts is that a homeowner buying standard
insurance will be quoted ‘full’ RCV coverage calculated through either
360Value or RCT, and that the quoted coverage limit will be profoundly
inadequate. To test this prediction, the Author ran two experiments on his
own house – several major insurers were contacted seeking a quote for
homeowner insurance on the house and the three estimating tools were run
to see what replacement costs each tool generated.
For context, here is a brief relevant history of the house: The house
was built in 1979. The Author purchased the house in 1998. In October 2003,
the house burned to the ground in the 2003 Cedar Fire. The house was rebuilt
and re-occupied in November 2004 (the total rebuild cost was approximately
$450,000). In the last five years the house had a roof leak – this was a covered
claim. The house also had some drywall cracks – an inquiry was made to the
insurer about whether repair work would be covered by insurance, an
adjuster performed an inspection, and the insurer reported that this was not
a covered event.
A.

TEST 1 – QUOTING INSURANCE ON THE AUTHOR’S HOUSE

One way to know how coverage limits are calculated, and what
producers represent (or not) about the adequacy of coverage estimates, is to
actually gather insurance premium quotes and estimates of adequate
coverage. What follows is the results of doing just that on the Author’s
house, contacting the author’s present insurer, an insurer the Author was
transferred to in the course of a call, and otherwise the largest homeowner
insurers in the United States as identified by the Insurance Information
Institute (citing the data collected by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners).183 Here are the results (the identity of each insurer is
masked in order to avoid any suggestion that this experiment is intended to
be derogatory of a particular insurer):
Insurer A: The estimate was done by filling out a form on-line. The
website described it was estimating using 360Value. The estimate required
input of details concerning the property taking approximately 15 minutes.
Estimated Replacement Cost: $595,000.184 The written quote states,
183

INS. INFO. INST., FACT & STATISTICS: HOMEOWNER AND RENTERS
INSURANCE, HOMEOWNER
INSURANCE
LOSSES
2011-2015,
https://www.iii.org/table-archive/21296.
184
E-mail from Insurer A to author (Mar. 22, 2018) (on file with author).
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“Estimated replacement cost is the estimated dollar amount of what it will
cost to rebuild your home today…. Please review the 360Value Report if you
think you may have entered information in error…. You can then use the
360Value Tool again to recalculate your estimated replacement cost.”185 By
a follow-up email, in response to the question, “I want enough insurance to
be confident that if my home was lost, I have enough coverage to rebuild it.
Is this enough? If not then how much should that be?,” a new quote was sent
estimating replacement cost at $607,050, and extensions of that coverage
raising the total dwelling coverage to $789,165.186
Insurer B (and Insurer C): The insurer has the applicant fill out a
form online, and then place a follow-up call to the insurer. The form took
about five minutes to complete. In the telephone call, the insurer said it was
not writing at present (a moratorium) on the address because of wildfire risk.
Per the insurer, the insurer “partners” with Insurer C and the insurer
transferred the call to a representative of Insurer C. Insurer C quoted Full
Replacement Coverage (described as binding), with an Estimated
Replacement Cost of $582,000. The quote included a 50% extension of this
replacement cost, if necessary. Also, in the conversation, the following
exchange occurred: “Q: You are confident that this is sufficient coverage to
rebuild our home should it burn down? A: Yes.”187 By email Insurer C gave
an estimated replacement coverage limit (including a 50% extension)
totaling $873,000, in response to the email inquiry: “I want enough insurance
to be confident that if my home was lost, I had enough coverage to rebuild
it. Is this enough? If not then how much should that be?”188
Insurers D and G: Both had a moratorium on the address because of
wildfire risk.189
Insurer E (telephone quote): The agent said Insurer E likely wouldn’t
differ much from the others because they all use the same software, and that
if the applicant could stay with their current insurer (who wrote Guaranteed
Replacement Coverage) then the applicant should. The agent said the
replacement cost estimates the other insurers were quoting were “silly”
low.190
185

Id.
E-mail to author (Mar. 28, 2018) (on file with author).
187
E-mail from insurer to Author (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author);
Telephone conversation with agent for insurer (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with
author).
188
E-mail from insurer to Author (Mar. 26, 2018) (on file with author).
189
Telephone conversations with insurers D and G (Mar. 12, 2018) (on
file with author).
190
Telephone conversation with insurer E (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with
186
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Insurer F (telephone quote): The agent said Insurer F uses 360Value,
which Insurer F referred to as the ‘industry standard.’ Because of the Fireline
code of 8 – insurance would require two policies, one from Insurer F and one
from the California FAIR Plan, and for this reason recommended the
applicant stay with their current insurer. Nonetheless the agent quoted Full
Replacement Coverage (at $237 per square feet) with a 25% extension. The
agent said they were “comfortable” this was adequate. The written quote
(sent by email) explicitly references 360Value, but also says the policyholder
should pick a different replacement coverage in order to “feel” they have
enough. Estimated Replacement Cost: $512,000.191
Insurer H (on-line and clarified through a transcribed on-line chat):
The chat representative described Estimated Replacement Coverage was
using 360Value. The chat representative also confirmed that if the website
inputs were conservative, that this “essentially” guaranteed replacement
coverage because the applicant would “have all the coverage [they] need.”
Estimated Replacement Cost: $554,000.192
Insurer I (on-line and by telephone): Insurer I writes through
independent agents. The agent suggested that to have confidence that there
was enough coverage to fully replace the home, there should be full
replacement coverage plus a 200% extension.193 Ultimately, no coverage was
quoted because of “claims history” in the previous three years.
Insurer J (in-person and by telephone): This is the Author’s present
insurer, through which the Author has Guaranteed Replacement Coverage.
This has been the author’s insurer for 20 years, and this was the first and only
in-person inspection (of approximately 15 minutes) of the home in 20 years,
and the only inspection by any of the contacted insurers. The inspection was
not prompted by this research but was coincidental.194 The estimate of
replacement cost was done using software from “Marshall &
Swift/Boeckh.”195 The estimated replacement cost from this inspection is

author).
191
Telephone conversation with insurer E (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with
author).
192
E-mail from insurer H to author (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author);
Transcript of chat with insurer H (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author).
193
Telephone conversation with insurer I (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with
author).
194
Telephone conversation with insurer J (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with
author).
195
Voicemail message from Allegra Christian (Mar. 21, 2018) (on file
with author).
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$672,000, and the policy has been renewed as guaranteed replacement
coverage.196
TEST 2 – REPLACEMENT COST ESTIMATING THE AUTHOR’S
HOUSE

B.

In the wake of the 2003 San Diego wildfires it was widely reported
that with a disturbing frequency, shortcuts cut deeply low.197 But that was a
forensic post hac explanation of “what happened.”
To test what actually happens in cost estimating (and the possibility
that a lot has changed in the intervening fifteen years), the Author of this
Article sought to run all three estimating software programs on his own
house. Here are the results:
RCT: CoreLogic provided the Author with portal access to the
software. Estimate using just the property address: Reconstruction cost
without debris removal -- $565,017; with debris removal -- $587,235.198
With input of detail by the homeowner, re-estimate done: Reconstruction
cost without debris removal -- $658,045; with debris removal -- $683,834.199
Pronto/Mainstreet: e2Value provided the Author with portal access
to the software. Estimate using just the property address: Reconstruction cost
without debris removal -- $646,000; with debris removal -- $678,000.200
Changing just a few of the assumptions in order to reflect the property more
accurately (input by the homeowner) – the style of the house and the
materials used for roofing – changed the estimate to $810,000 and $850,000

196
197

Id.
See,

e.g., Elliot Spagat, Insurance calculator questioned,
WASHINGTON POST (July 24, 2004), http://www.carehelp.org/files/News/20
040711_Homeowners_haunted_by_underinsurance.pdf; Jospeh B. Treatser,
Homeowners Come Up Short On Insurance, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 31,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/31/business/homeowners-comeup-short-on-insurance.html; Jeanette Steele, Coverage gap in rebuilding
linked to cost calculators, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 22, 2004),
http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/fires/20040822-9999-1n22in
ssoft.html; Company drops insurance calculator amid criticism, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Nov. 18, 2004), http://billingsgazette.com/business/companydropsinsurance-calculator-amid-criticism/article_293fc05e-ad31-5001-afea
-f5ca544a4c91.html.
198
CoreLogic, Data entry report (on file with author).
199
CoreLogic, Data entry report (on file with author).
200
e2Value report (on file with author).

82

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 25

respectively.201 Changing the “quality of construction” from “above
average/upgraded” to “expensive/custom” (again by the homeowner)
changes the numbers to $902,000 and $947,000. 202 A Mainstreet estimate
done using “Residential Full,” meaning inputting the most detail possible (by
the homeowner) -- estimated replacement cost with debris removal:
$1,134,000; without debris removal: $1,080,000. 203
360Value: The quotes from Insurers A, F, and H all were explicitly
based on homeowner input into 360Value. An expert on doing valuation
using Verisk software was contacted and asked to do a valuation based on
his in-person inspection. The expert responded that to generate a defensible,
accurate valuation would require at least three separate visits (at an expense
of $195 an hour) and about an additional $2,000 in costs for technology and
support.204 The expert indicated that he would expect the resulting figure to
be materially higher than an estimate applying a dozen or so parameters from
the homeowner input into Verisk cost estimating software, which routinely
omits components and understates components.205
V.

RISK ALLOCATION

All of this adds up to pervasive, unintended, inadequate RCV
coverage limits. As e2Value recognizes, “any discrepancy between
estimated and actual replacement costs can translate into financial risk….”206
The question then becomes, a risk to whom?
A.

THE CONTRACTUAL LANDSCAPE

An insurance contract is, even from a theoretical economist’s point
of view, an unusual contract. An economist would posit that in any contract,
both sides bear or retain some risk.207 An insurance contract, however,
literally is a contract buying and selling risk.208 So, an insurance contract
201

e2Value report (on file with author).
e2Value report (on file with author).
203
e2Value report (on file with author).
204
July 11, 2018 email from Sean Scott to Ken Klein on file with author.
205
July 13, 2018 email from Sean Scott to Ken Klein on file with author.
206
e2Value, supra note 122.
207
See Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington, An Introduction to
Insurance Economics, FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS:
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 2 (Georges Dionne & Scott E.
Harrington eds., 1992) (“Risk is seldom completely shifted in any market.”).
208
See id. at 1-2 (“In the usual insurance example, risk averse individuals
202
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should quite explicitly spell out what risk each side bears or retains. If a
homeowner buys what is represented as ‘full’ coverage, then that presents as
an agreement that the only risk that the policyholder retains is the amount of
the deductible. A policyholder may be oblivious either to a treacherous legal
landscape or language within a lengthy and obtuse contract that seeks to
reverse this intuitive understanding.209
But even in insurance contracts representing that the insured has full
RCV, there often is wiggle language. The CDOI provides a tool that allows
a homeowner to see exemplar insurance policies from various insurers.210
Using this tool, one can see that within the insurance agreement, “Farmers
Smart Plan Home Policy California,” is the language:
The Coverage A (Dwelling) stated limit is the most we will pay if
your dwelling sustains a loss. The actual cost to replace the dwelling
at the time of loss may be different. We do not guarantee that the
stated limit represents the actual cost to replace the dwelling.211
There are no similar clauses in posted insurance policies from other
major home insurers. But similar language is quoted from an Allstate policy
in a complaint file of the CDOI.212
And from occasional litigation files it is apparent that there are
clauses that are not seen on the CDOI web site, because rather than reside in
base insurance policies, they reside in renewal notices. In Everett v. State
Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,213 for example, the court quoted a clause that State Farm
included with its insurance renewal notice:

confronted with risk are willing to pay a fixed price to a less risk averse or
more diversified insurer who offers to bear the risk at that price.”).
209
See also Klein, supra note 3, at 373-76 (discussing the special
challenges of the often-obtuse language of insurance agreements).
210
California Dept. Ins., Homeowners Coverage Comparison Tool,
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/apex/f?p=143:16:0::NO(last visited
April 2, 2018).
211
Farmers Insurance, Farmers Smart Plan Home Policy California at
5.
212
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 163, 378-79 (“Allstate’s estimated replacement
cost...is...only an estimate.... The decision regarding the limit applicable to
Coverage A...is your decision to make....”).
213
Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 653
(2008).

84

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 25

The State Farm replacement cost is an estimate replacement cost
based on general information about your home. It is developed from
models that use cost of construction materials and rates for homes
like homes in the area. The actual cost to replace your home may be
significantly different. State Farm does not guarantee that this figure
will represent the actual cost to replace your home. You are
responsible for selecting the appropriate amount of coverage and you
may obtain an appraisal or contractor estimate which State Farm will
consider and accept, if reasonable. Higher coverage amounts may be
selected and will result in higher premiums.214
Additionally, a Complaint filed in California attached as an exhibit
a form USAA sent to its insured at time of renewal stating:
Our mission at USAA is to help protect your financial security. One
way we do this is by helping you determine if you’re adequately
covered in the event of a loss. We can calculate the minimum
rebuilding cost of your home based on your home characteristics, but
only you can decide if this is enough coverage.215
There is no known compilation of renewal notice language (as
opposed to base policies). It may be that variations of this contractual text
are very prevalent in the industry, but primarily only in renewal notices. But
that is speculation. What can be said with clarity is that just these four
companies – Farmers, State Farm, Allstate, and USAA – measured by direct
premium, represent 39.77% of all homeowner multi-peril insurance written
in 2016.216
There also are ‘meeting of the minds’ challenges. No matter how
clearly these clauses are written, there is some likelihood that policyholders
are unaware of them. As one author of an insurance law treatise describes,
“an insured relies not upon the text of the policies but upon the general
description of the coverage provided by the insurer and its agents.”217 The
214

Id. at 816. Nearly identical language is found in a 2004 State Farm
estimate now lodged in the public record. See Administrative Rulemaking
File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 624. Accord
id. at vol. III, p. 799.
215
Exh. A to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 134.
216
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2016 Market
Share Reports for Property/Casualty Groups and Companies by State and
Countrywide, 139 (2017), http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/MSR-PB-17.pdf.
217
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §32[b]
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insurance industry self-describes that homeowner are “fuzzy on the details”
of their insurance policies.218 In insurance-commissioned surveys, the point
is confirmed -- according to “the results of a survey by Zogby International
for MetLife Auto & Home,” “[m]ore than two thirds (71 percent) of those
surveyed believe insurance pays for the full cost to rebuild their property in
the event of a major loss, such as a fire or other natural disaster.”219
And then there are the possible parol evidence problems. As
referenced earlier, State Departments of Insurance across the country advise
homeowners to ask their insurer or agent for the amount of coverage
necessary to replace a home.220 Similarly, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners advises consumers, “Your insurance agent usually
will help you decide how much dwelling coverage to buy when you get
homeowners insurance,” adding, “Your coverage should equal the full
replacement cost of your home.”221
These parol conversations occur with an indeterminable frequency.
The CDOI asserts it has sometimes been “flooded” with homeowners
reporting agents/brokers told them they had adequate coverage,222 while the
(Mathew Bender, 2d ed. 1996); accord Thomas Holzheu & Ginger Turner,
The Natural Catastrophe Protection Gap: Measurement, Root Causes and
Ways of Addressing Underinsurance for Extreme Events, 43 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 37, 42 (2018).
218
INS. INFO. INST., supra note 24, at 7. Accord Hassani, supra note 2, at
109-10.
219
Homeowner Coverage Knowledge Gap Wide Among Consumers,
INSURANCE JOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.insurancejournal.com
/news/national/2010/08/24/112704.htm.
220
Texas Department of Insurance et al., supra note 69.
221
National Association Insurance Commissioners, A Consumer’s Guide
to Home Insurance, 4 (2010), www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_h
ome.pdf. Accord Collier & Ragin, supra note 62, at 1, 3.
222
Appellant’s Opening Brief, Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 2 Cal. 5th
376 (2017) (No. S226529) 2014 WL 508598, at *1; see also Appellant’s
Opening Brief on the Merits, Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 2 Cal. 5th 376
(2017) (No. S226529) 2015 WL 6114253, at *10. For an example of such a
homeowner assertion, see what one homeowner wrote to the CDOI on
September 2009: “We had a conversation with our agent … just after we
completed a major remodel of our home. … The meeting took place at our
home and our policy limits were reset as a result. During this conversation I
made it clear that one of the reasons we were doing this was to ensure we
were not in the position of the Cedar Fire people that ended up short on
insurance. When I asked [the agent] if the amount he was recommending
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insurance industry calls those claims “hyperbole.”223 One example from the
anecdotal work described above, however, may explain how these differing
perceptions persist. In a transcribed chat, Insurer H – in response to the
question, “Okay. I know you do not write Guaranteed Replacement
Coverage (my old insurer did but I fear that I may no longer be able to renew
in that form), but am I correct that if I do as you recommend then that is
essentially what I have because I have all the coverage I need?” – answered:
“Yes, that is correct.”224 Yet Insurer H – in a footnote to its written quote
generated simultaneously with that transcribed chat – states:
This represents an estimated minimum rebuilding cost…. Please
keep this in mind when you determine sufficient coverage for your
home. [Insurer H] cannot guarantee the rebuilding cost estimate will
be sufficient in the event of a loss. Please remember it is your
responsibility to…make sure your coverage is adequate to rebuild
your home.”225
In a telephone to call seeking to clarify this discrepancy, the insurer
acknowledged that as to accurately estimating replacement cost, a
homeowner is “not a builder, you’re not gonna [sic] know that;” reassured
that the insurer’s estimates were “accurate over 90% of the time;” but noted
the language was added to the written quote because it “was not a
guarantee.”226
Chubb Insurance’s website provides another example of how
insureds and insurers might come away with differing perceptions. The
website says, “Chubb’s in-house Risk Consultants can help determine the
amount of coverage you need. …Using the information gathered during an
in-home visit and incorporating the knowledge and experience Chubb has
gained through thousands of interviews with building contractors each year,
a Risk Consultant will estimate the replacement cost for your home.”227 Is
that a representation that the homeowner can rely on the Chubb estimate, or
is it not?

was sufficient to replace our house, he said yes.” Administrative Rulemaking
File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 906.
223
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 53, at *4-5.
224
Transcript of chat with insurer H, supra note 192.
225
Transcript of chat with insurer H, supra note 192.
226
Telephone conversation with insurer H (Apr. 5, 2018) (on file with
author).
227
Chubb, supra note 13.
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Similarly, the CDOI’s Administrative Rulemaking File contains a
document from 2004 where one insurance agency distributed to
policyholders a ‘FAQ’ sheet that led with the question, “How do we know
that the stated insurance amount is enough to cover our home or building?”,
and answered, “The dwelling amount is based on a current estimate of the
replacement cost of the structure. It is not necessary to insure the land, the
market value of the property, or the loan amount.”228 The document is silent
on whose estimate is referred to.229
Based on compiling numerous anecdotal parol reports such as these,
the CDOI survey concluded:
In general, each insurer had its own replacement cost estimating tool
and the value generated by this tool was considered (from the
insurer’s perspective) to be the minimum Coverage A limit for which
the policy could be issued. Each insurer stated that the insured was
responsible for making the limit selection based on his or her
knowledge regarding the home, but was able to make use of the
insurer’s tool to assist with this selection. There were varying
degrees of communication and disclosure to the insured regarding
what the estimate generated by the insurer’s tool represented, and
regarding the insured’s duty to determine the amount of coverage he
or she determined to be appropriate.230
Then there are timing issues. As one academic center studying
insurance notes, “Insurance is the only product for which consumers do not
know what they are buying before they buy it. Insurance companies almost
never provide copies of policy language or complete summaries of policy
terms to prospective policyholders.”231
Nonetheless, insurers still sometimes blame the policyholder for
underinsurance.232 Indeed, the first public comment offered in the
“Homeowners Insurance Hearing” held by the CDOI in 2009 was: “In
general, ACIC members believe that the responsibility for determining the
228

Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 329.
229
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 329.
230
Id. at 1029.
231
Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility, Essential Protections for
Policyholders, 10 (2016), http://uphelp.org/sites/default/files/guides/epp_10
-18-2016.pdf (last visited April 2, 2018).
232
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 3, at 364-65.
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level of coverage provided in a homeowners insurance policy must be a
decision that rests with the insured.”233
If one were to posit that the homeowner bears the primary
responsibility for selecting adequate coverage limits, then the next question
would be to ask precisely how the homeowner could discharge that
responsibility? Because generally the homeowner does not actually have the
knowledge or expertise to calculate the cost of rebuilding their home, and is
almost never the one being asked to determine that cost.234 Much more
typically, as one homeowner wrote after losing her home to fire in 2007:
When my agent wrote our policy, he asked me only a few questions
…. I answered each every [sic] question that he asked of me. The
fact that some characteristics were not included is because I was not
asked. Since I am not in the business of insuring a home’s
replacement value, I had no idea what questions or what
characteristics should be included.235

233

Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 424-26, 1114. Similarly, a document Farmers
Insurance Group sent to insureds entitled, “Make sure you’re not underinsured”, that says among other things: We want to help you choose the
amount of coverage that is right for you.…The information we have on
record about your home is important because with each renewal offer, we
use it to calculate a reconstruction cost estimate. You can use the estimate as
a guide to help you choose the amount of coverage you want for your home.
If you don’t have enough coverage, you could be under-insured. If you don’t
have enough coverage, you could be under-insured. And if your house were
totally destroyed, that could mean being unable to pay for complete
reconstruction.… The reconstruction cost estimate can serve as a guide, but
it is your responsibility to choose the Coverage A limit that is right for you.…
You may choose Coverage A limit higher than the estimate, or you have the
option to reduce the limit to an amount equal to the estimate.
234
See Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 222, at *8
(“The Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee…noted that
homeowner’ lack of knowledge about construction costs, and improperly
trained insurance industry personnel estimating replacement costs,
contributed to underinsurance. The Committee declared that it is “critical
that initial policy limits be set accurately and updated regularly.”). Accord
note 226 supra and accompanying text. See also note 220.
235
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 105. Accord id. at 218 (“Not being experts about
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As another wrote:
I lost my cabin in the 2007 Slide Fire. I an [sic] underinsured because
State Farm not doing their job [sic]. They denied my claim, with
some nebulous nonsense. According to them, they do not insure for
an amount, just an estimate. I am suppose [sic] to know what and
how to insure? I’m suppose [sic] to be the expert? Are they or are
they not in the insurance business? Do they know or know what they
are doing? They advertise that they are the professionals and behind
you, but you couldn’t prove it my [sic] me after this past year.236
Yet producers also lack the time or expertise. Producers simply use
the cost estimators given to them, and often apply shortcuts (doomed to
understate coverage) embedded and promoted in the software (and which the
compensation structures incentivize the agents to apply).237
There is little a homeowner can do to remedy this problem. Per I.I.I.
literature written to homeowners, other than relying on an insurance agent, a
homeowner could “call your local real estate agent [or] builders association
….”238 This recommendation is incongruous with other advice from I.I.I.
Real estate agents are experts on home values. The I.I.I. emphasizes that
there is a difference between the price of a home and the cost to rebuild a
home.239 Market value and replacement cost simply are distinct
conceptually.240 It seems fantastical to suppose that a real estate agent would
either the cost of new home building or home insurance, we accepted the
policy as written by USAA.”), at 723 (“My husband and I have no experience
or expertise in any phase of construction of homes or costs and did not
question the amounts [comprising the estimated replacement cost].”).
236
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 822.
237
See infra sections III.B.1.a & III.B.2.a, fns. 33 & 34 and
accompanying text.
238
INS. INFO. INST., supra note 71. See also Barry Zalma, Uncovered:
Who’s Responsible for Setting Policy Limits?, CLAIMS MAG., June 2017 at
22, 23.
239
INS. INFO. INST., supra note 72, at 2 (“The amount of insurance you
buy should be based on rebuilding costs, not the price of your home. The
cost of rebuilding your house may be higher (or lower) than the price you
paid for it or the price you could sell it for today.”).
240
See, e.g., Replacement Cost vs. Market Value, STATE FARM MUT.
AUTOMOBILE INS. CO., https://www.statefarm.com/simple-insights/plannin
g/replacement-cost-vs-market-value. (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); James
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– in a context where there are potential legal liability consequences to error
– estimate rebuild costs of a home. It simply is not their core competency or
expertise.
Builders similarly are a misfit to supporting a policyholder’s need to
determine of adequate coverage. The entire business model of Verisk is that
they can sell that expertise to, among others, building contractors because
builders too lack the knowledge, inclination, or expertise.241 As one amici
wrote to the California Supreme Court, “contractors are not in the business
of providing free estimates for hypothetical construction projects.” And if
they were, they likely would do it poorly.242
The homeowner simply is not positioned to determine the adequacy
of coverage. Nonetheless, the legal landscape often reaches a different
conclusion.
B.

THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

One former state Deputy Director of Insurance suggests that state
Insurance Commissioners have the power to collect the data necessary to
address underinsurance, have collected the information, but largely have
done nothing with it.243
It is possible for insurance regulators to put a thumb on the scales of
risk shifting. California regulators have done so. Effective June 27, 2011, the
CDOI adopted a new regulation standardizing the components of an insurer’s
replacement cost estimate.244 The regulation requires insurers write RCV

Siebers, Market Value vs. Replacement Cost, CORELOGIC
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2016/03/market-value-vs-replacementcost.aspx.
241
See, e.g., Xactware, Xactware Webcast.: Introducing Restoration
Manager: Helping Contractors Get a Read on Their Business,
https://www.xactware.com/en-us/resources/webcasts/upcoming-webcasts/
introducing-restoration-manager---helping-contractors-get-a-bead-on-theirbusiness/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); 360Value, supra note 93, at 8
(“Xactimate...is used by...80 percent of insurance repair contractors”);
Accord Appellant’s Reply Brief, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th
1009 (2015) (No. S226529) 2014 WL 3014611, at *8 (“A contractor can bill
the homeowner for cost overruns during construction, but the homeowner
cannot receive coverage over the limits of a replacement cost policy.”).
242
Amicus Brief of United Policy Holders, supra note 81, at *16-17;
Whatley, supra note 106, at 5, 7-8.
243
Berry, supra note 15.
244
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2695.183 (2011).
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utilizing cost estimating to account for several delineated features of the
insured home:
(1) Cost of labor, building materials and supplies;
(2) Overhead and profit;
(3) Cost of demolition and debris removal;
(4) Cost of permits and architect’s plans; and
(5) Consideration of components and features of the insured structure,
including at least the following:
(A) Type of foundation;
(B) Type of frame;
(C) Roofing materials and type of roof;
(D) Siding materials and type of siding;
(E) Whether the structure is located on a slope;
(F) The square footage of the living space;
(G) Geographic location of property;
(H) Number of stories and any nonstandard wall heights;
(I) Materials used in, and generic types of, interior features and
finishes, such as, where applicable, the type of heating and air
conditioning system, walls, flooring, ceiling, fireplaces,
kitchen, and bath(s);
(J) Age of the structure or the year it was built; and
(K) Size and type of attached garage.245
Importantly, the regulation distinguishes between insurers and
producers. One of the changes that insurance agents successfully lobbied for
in the California regulations was to clarify that when producers were using
tools that were provided to them by insurers, if the tools estimated in error,
then that was on the insurer, not on the producer.246
But California’s intervention by regulation may not be a panacea.
Just as tobacco companies relied on the government-mandated health
warnings on a package of cigarettes as a defense to a charge that smokers
were not adequately warned, compliance with the insurance regulation might
provide a defense to insurers if the resulting estimate is still too low.247

245

§ 2695.183.
Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, §
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1489-96.
247
See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-21 (1992).
246
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THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE

It is, of course, possible for a state to legislatively step into the
underwriting landscape, rather than leaving the matter to courts or regulators.
Fourteen states affirmatively prohibit the policyholder, an insurer, and/or an
agent from knowingly agreeing to over-insure.248 For example, Minnesota
law provides, “No company shall knowingly issue any policy upon property
in this state for an amount which … exceeds the replacement cost of the
buildings ….”249
Colorado law provides that before issuance or renewal of full
replacement cost homeowner insurance (defined as the dwelling limit is
equal to or greater than the estimated replacement cost of the residence) the
insurer shall make available at least ten percent extended replacement cost
coverage.250
Florida law provides, “prior to issuing a homeowner’s insurance
policy, the insurer must offer … a policy or endorsement providing …
replacement costs to the dwelling….”251
Conversely, while it is an ever-changing landscape, roughly twenty
states have valued policy laws requiring that in the event of a total loss an
insurer must pay the coverage limit of the policy whether the actual
replacement cost reaches (or exceeds) this value or not.252
D.

THE JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDSCAPE

A comprehensive review of caselaw broadly addressing coverage
adequacy in contract and tort law is beyond the scope of a subsection within
an article.253 But there is a somewhat discrete set of published cases
248

ALASKA STAT. § 21.60.010 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-5(6)(A)
(West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10E-102 (West 2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.20-260 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65A.09 (West
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-5 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
44-603 (West 2010); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.19 (West 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-43-5 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.200
(West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-20 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 567-801 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.27.010 (West 2010);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-23-101 (West 2011).
249
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65A.09(1) West (2005).
250
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §10-4-1108(6)(a) (West 2013).
251
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7011 (West 2011).
252
See Molk, supra note 11, at 362, 364, 386.
253
See Joshua Fox, Comment, Softening the Short Shrift: Regulating
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addressing the argument that coverage is ultimately the homeowner’s
responsibility.254
In Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,255 Ms. Everett – whose San
Bernardino, California home initially was insured with a stated dwelling
replacement cost but had guaranteed replacement (read: unlimited) coverage
– had for several years had full replacement (read: limited) coverage
annually renewed with notices reminding her it was “her responsibility to
insure her home with adequate coverage.”256 After her home burned down in
2003, she sued State Farm both in contract and tort alleging that even with a
coverage limit extension she was underinsured.257 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for State Farm, holding
the policy had limited dwelling replacement coverage in clear and
unambiguous language, “nothing in the record suggests that the original
policy limits were insufficient,” and it was not State Farm’s duty to maintain
adequate limits.258
In Bryce v. Unitrin Preferred Ins. Co.,259 after a 2006 fire destroyed
the Bryce’s home in Georgetown, Texas, the Bryces learned their
‘replacement cost’ insurance was “grossly inadequate.”260 For several years,
the Bryces had been involved in a series of conversations about coverage and
policy renewal, beginning when the Bryces changed insurers and opted to
keep the prior insurer’s coverage limits in place;261 of these most notably the
agent recalled recommending the Bryces consult with a builder on
determining replacement cost, while the Bryces recalled being told by the
agent that the insurance was adequate.262 “After hearing the evidence, the
jury returned a unanimous verdict that the Bryces’ negligence alone
proximately caused their home to be underinsured.”263 The appellate court

Homeowners Insurance Limits as Causes of Underinsurance, 46 CAL. W. L.
REV. 369 (2010) (providing a broad summary of the case law).
254
Hassani, supra note 2, at 81-83; accord Ramsay & Heffernan, supra
note 169, at 2-4.
255
Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649 (2008).
256
Id. at 652-53.
257
Id. at 653-54.
258
Id. at 657-61.
259
Bryce v. Unitrin Preferred Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00670-CV, 2010 WL
01253579 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2010).
260
Id. at *1.
261
Id. at *1-*3.
262
Id. at *2-*3.
263
Id. at *4.
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affirmed.264 The appellate court noted Texas law, “does not, as the Bryces
contend, create a duty on the part of either an agent or an insurance carrier
to monitor an insured’s policy in order to ensure that the requested coverage
is adequate.”265 Further, an insurer inspection of a home – per the Texas court
– is for the benefit of the insurer, not the insured.266
In Furtak v. Moffett,267 after a 1992 fire destroyed the Furtaks’
Highland Park, Illinois home, the Furtaks found themselves with insurance
of roughly 1/6th the appraised value of their home.268 The Furtaks claimed
that in 1975 when they purchased the home, they requested insurance agent
“Moffett provide insurance that would fully cover their home against all loss,
and Moffett offered them a policy that would fully cover their home even in
the worst case scenario.”269 There was no home inspection and there was a
notation that the home was being completely renovated and remodeled.270
The insurance was renewed for the next 15 years, without inquiry from the
agent or notice from the homeowner about the outcome of the renovations
and remodeling.271 At trial, the Furtaks conceded that under Illinois law it
was their burden to know the contents of their policy, to draw any
discrepancies to the insurer’s attention, and that the insurer had no duty to
review the adequacy of coverage; nonetheless, the Furtaks contended that
the insurer – Farmers – had voluntarily undertaken a duty to determine
adequacy of coverage of its insureds through a series of actions, but had
failed to do so for the Furtaks.272 The appellate court held, “The fact that
defendants instituted procedures to determine whether their insureds were
underinsured and Farmers encouraged their agents to inform their insureds
that they should evaluate the adequacy of their coverage does not impose
upon them a duty to warn plaintiffs of their inadequate insurance.”273 As to
any breach of oral contract claim, the appellate court rejected it as contrary
to the Illinois statute of frauds.274

264

Id. at *10.
Id. at *5.
266
Id. at *7-*8.
267
Furtak v. Moffett, 671 N.E. 2d 827 (Ill. 1996).
268
Id. at 829.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 830.
274
Id.
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In Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 275 a 1979 fire completely
destroyed the plaintiffs’ building in Saginaw, Michigan.276 The building
owners and their insurance agent agreed that an insurer – Aetna – appraised
the building and set the replacement cost of the building.277 The building
owners and their insurance agent then used that appraisal to place insurance
with the defendant insurer because it came at a cheaper premium than Aetna
quoted.278 The defendant insurer then did their own inspection and estimate
– a higher replacement coverage was estimated – and plaintiffs insured to
that new figure.279 After the fire, the true replacement cost was over double
any figure any insurer estimated.280 On these rather dramatic facts, the
plaintiffs sued asserting negligence, they won at trial, and the appellate court
affirmed.281 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
defendant – having voluntarily undertaken to inspect the property knowing
the plaintiffs would rely on the findings of that inspection – negligently
caused the property to be underinsured.282 In contrast to Schanz, in Chemical
Technology, Inc. v. Berkshire Agency, Inc.,283 the court confirmed that in
Michigan, unless something changes the usual situation of agents taking
orders from customers, generally, “insurance agents have no duty to advise
the inured regarding the adequacy of insurance coverage.”284
In Peterson v. Big Bend Ins. Agency, Inc.,285 when the Petersons
purchased homeowner insurance they “explained their desire to have their
home insured for the full replacement value.”286 “The Petersons indicated
they did not know what the cost of this coverage would be or how such a
figure would be determined.”287 Their insurance agent used software
identified as the “Boeckh Cost Guide” (per the court, “this software, or a
275

Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 418 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. 1988).
Id. at 479.
277
Id. at 480.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 481, 484.
282
Id. at 482-83.
283
Chemical Technology, Inc. v. Berkshire Agency, Inc., No. 326394,
2016 WL 4008455, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).
284
Id. at *2 (quoting Harts v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 597 N.W.2d 47, 50
(1999)).
285
Peterson v. Big Bend Ins. Agency, Inc., 202 P.3d 372 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009).
286
Id. at 374.
287
Id. at 375.
276
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similar program, is a standard in the insurance industry”) to estimate the cost
to replace the home in the event of a total loss.288 This involved personal
inspections of the exterior, as well as drawn diagrams of the home (and later
describing some of the information in writing to the homeowner, but actually
calculating replacement value differently than as described).289 When their
home was destroyed by fire, their coverage was less than 2/3rds of the true
replacement value.290 On these facts, the trial court found the defendant
negligent for providing an estimate represented as calculated one way when
in fact it was calculated another way.291 The appellate court affirmed, but
only because the agent did not use the Boeckh calculator – the court found
that if the agent had done so then there would be no liability.292
No wonder, as one California lawyer and insurance consultant wrote
in 2017:
[…]it is incumbent on the agent or broker to remind the applicant for
insurance to set appropriate limits to avoid underinsurance…. When
an insured loses everything in a catastrophe, he or she calls an
insurance agent, insurance broker or insurance company to make a
claim. When the claim is made, the insured is reminded of the limit
of liability chosen, only to find it is inadequate to replace the
house…. The insured will be angry and unwilling to accept the fact
that the inadequate policy limit is due to his or her error. Suits are
filed…only to find that the court will not cure the insured’s
mistake.293
Or as Professor Tom Baker writes, “insurance coverage
litigation is simultaneously about abandonment and greed.”294
288

Id.
Id.
290
Id. at 374.
291
Id. at 376.
292
Id. at 377-78 (quoting, Gates v. Logan, 862 P.2d 134, 136 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (“Ordinarily the insured knows the extent of his personal assets
and ability to pay increased premiums better than the insurance agent.”) and
Virgil R. Lee & Son, Inc., 754 P.2d 155, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (“[I]t is
the insured’s responsibility to advise the agent of the insurance he wants,
including the limits of the policy to be issued.”)).
293
Zalma supra note 238, at 23; accord Michael J. Geiger & Gregory J.
Schwartz, Phantom Insurance Coverage in the New Underinsurance
Gambit, 10 ENVTL. CL. J. 5 (1998).
294
Tom Baker, Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract
289
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So where does this leave the question of who bears the financial risk
of any discrepancy between estimated and actual replacement costs? The
answer is that it is mixed. But that with some frequency, the policyholder
bears the risk.
An example from litigation concretely illustrates the matter. When
– in the wake of the 2017 Northern California wildfires – a group of USAA
insureds sued USAA and Xactware, USAA demurred (the California
procedural device for a pre-answer attack on the basis of the failure to state
a claim) asserting it was only responsible for the contracted for policy limits,
while Xactware demurred asserting it had no legal privity with individual
policyholders.295 Both entities looked at the legal landscape and saw they
could assert a plausible, possible safe harbor even if each knowingly
understated the replacement cost of the insured homes.296
This is why a 2011 article concludes:
Homeowner insurance policyholders are ill-equipped to determine
the appropriate limits for their insurance policies. The current legal
framework defining insurers’ obligations to their insureds does not
effectively account for this reality, in turn providing an incentive for
insurers to sustain ambiguity and confusion regarding a duty to
accurately assess replacement costs.297
VI.

MORAL HAZARD-LIKE PROBLEMS ENCOURAGING PERVASIVE,
UNWITTING UNDERINSURANCE

Insurers are neither charities nor churches. Insurers do not pay
claims because insureds need the money, or because it is the ‘right’ thing to

Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1994).
295
Defendant United Services Automobile Association’s Notice of
Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint;
Memorandum of Pints and Authorities in Support of Thereof, Bivin et al. v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n et al., No. SCV261717 (Super. Ct. Cal. County
of Sonoma, Apr. 5, 2018); Defendant Xactware Solutions, Inc.’s Notice of
Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint;
Memorandum of Pints and Authorities in Support Thereof, Bivin et al. v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n et al., No. SCV261717 (Super. Ct. Cal. County
of Sonoma, June 6, 2018).
296
Id.
297
Fox, supra note 253, at 394.
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do.298 Insurers pay claims because they legally are obligated to do so. And as
for-profit businesses, if regulators, legislators, and courts permit insurers to
increase profits by precisely navigating the intersection of coverage limits
and replacement cost estimating, then one should expect insurers to do so.
But that still leaves hanging out there the question: If homeowners
are willing to pay for full and adequate RCV and producers have incentives
to sell full and adequate RCV, then why would an insurer either want to or
knowingly tolerate the sale of nominally full but actually inadequate RCV?
The short answer is an insurer may be rewarded for underinsuring and may
be punished for over-insuring. Put another way, because the legal landscape
protects insurers from the consequence of inadequate coverage, the aspects
of cost estimating that result in nominally full but actually inadequate
coverage turn out to be features rather than glitches.
A.

UNDERINSURING CAN BE PROFITABLE FOR INSURERS

Altered incentives analogous to moral hazard concerns encourage an
insurer to underinsure. There is no single, accepted definition of “moral
hazard.”299 Krugman’s definition – “any situation in which one person makes
the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost
of things going badly”300 – is a quite workable big tent to encapsulate the
many iterations of the concept.
In insurance, there is much contemporary work on moral hazard.301
In the context of predicting behaviors of insureds, simply stated, “Moral
See Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y. 559 (2010)
(discussing the narratives and counter-narratives of morality in insurance).
299
David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral
Hazard”, 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051 (2012); accord Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
300
See KRUGMAN, supra note 10, at 63; Definition of ‘Moral Hazard’,
supra note 10, (“Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved
in a risky event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other
party will incur the cost.”).
301
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Further Comment, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING (Julius
Margolis, ed.) (Markham 1971); Ralph A. Winter, Optimal Insurance Under
Moral Hazard, reprinted in GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE
155-183 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) (describing how moral hazard leads to
less than full insurance); Baker, supra note 293; Tom Baker, Containing the
Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 371 (2003); Baker, supra note 298; John M. Marshall, Moral
298

2018

MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP

99

hazard refers…to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an
individual’s motive to prevent loss.”302 Molk writes, “Moral hazard is a
dominant concern of insurance companies….”303 But as Molk shows, at least
in the context of homeowner insurance, there is considerable question
whether the predictions the theory of moral hazard makes about policyholder
behavior are confirmed by actual behavior.304
The theory of moral hazard actually seems to fare better in
explaining actual behaviors of insurers.305 For example, when a state
guarantees life insurance proceeds in the event of insurer insolvency, life
insurers more frequently hold highly leveraged portfolios composed of risky
assets.306 The same effect can be seen by banks in response to FDIC
insurance: “It has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that
deposit insurance for commercial banks and savings and loan associations
(S&Ls) creates a moral hazard problem by shielding creditors from the
consequences of risk taking.”307 Economists see similar behavior by
property-casualty insurers in response to the likelihood of state and federal

Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); J.A. Mirreles, The Theory of Moral
Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I, 66 REV. ECON. STUDIES 3
(1999); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 92
QUART. J. ECON. 541 (1979).
302
Shavell, supra note 301, at 541. Under this definition, the general
presumption is that full insurance coverage encourages risky behavior and
so an insurer should not offer full coverage, but that if the cost of monitoring
insured’s behavior is minimal, then coverage approaching full insurance is
optimal. Id. at 541-42.
303
Molk, supra note 11, at 349.
304
Id. at 350-51, 392-93.
305
See, e.g., Neil Bhutta & Benjamin J. Keys, Eyes Wide Shut? The
Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers During the Housing Boom, (Nat’l.
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24844, 2018),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24844 (documenting moral hazard behavior
of private mortgage insurers).
306
Elijah Brewer III, Thomas S. Mondschean, & Philip E. Strahan, The
Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with
Government Guarantees: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry, 64 J.
RISK & INS. 301, 304, 320 (1997); Brian J. Hall & and James G. Bohn, The
Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5911, 1997), https://ssrn.com/abstract=225693.
307
Brewer, Mondschean, Strahan, supra note 306, at 301-04.
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disaster recovery resources.308 As Tom Baker has explored and explained,
one should fully expect that an insurer will be the economically, ruthlessly
opportunistic actor predicted by the theory of moral hazard.309
Replacement cost estimators do not give insurers control over the
quantity of risk they underwrite, nor do they lead to insurers mis-pricing the
risk. Rather, replacement cost estimators create an asymmetry of
understanding between an insurer and a policyholder of quantity of risk
being sold. Policyholders think they are buying truly full replacement
coverage while insurers know the likelihood that the coverage limits could
be inadequate. Economists might differ about whether this is a classic ‘moral
hazard problem.’ But it unquestionably is an opportunity for an
opportunistic, profit-maximizing motivated actor.
An insurer knows – through years of accreted experience – that costs
estimators pervasively calculate full replacement cost profoundly low.
Insurers perceive that the customer is a low-information, price elastic
customer; i.e., a customer likely to be attracted to a low premium and
unlikely to be sensitive to the risk attendant to it.310 Most “underinsureds”
will not ever sustain a total loss exposing the risk.311 Should that risk
materialize, some insureds will be litigation averse (for any host of reasons
including, perhaps, learning of the uncertain legal landscape) and thus not
challenge the claims adjustment; of those who do, many either will settle at
below the uninsured portion of the loss or will simply lack the resources to
see the dispute through; and of the subset who do see the dispute through,
308

See, e.g., Paul Hudson, W.J. Wouter Botzen, Jeffrey Czajkowski, &
Heidi Kreibich, Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets:
Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States, 93 LAND ECON.
179 (2017); Carolyn Kousky & Leonard Shabman, The Hazard of the Moral
Hazard – or Not, NAT. HAZARDS OBSERVER (May 2013), https://hazards.col
orado.edu/uploads/observer/2013/may13_observerweb.pdf; George L. Priest,
The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996).
309
See Baker, supra note 298.
310
See Ramsay & Heffernan, supra note 169, at 10-11; accord Insurance
Brokers and Agents of the West, supra note 68.
311
See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., supra note 183 (“About one in 290 insured
homes has a property damage claim related to fire and lightning.”); id. at 183
(“In 2014, 5.46% of insured homes had a claim, according to ISO. Property
damage, including theft, accounted for 95.9% of those claims.” The average
insurance claim is for less than $10,000); Klein, supra note 3, at 353-54 (in
2007, one-twentieth of one percent of U.S. homes had a disaster loss forcing
relocation from the home).
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only some will recover the entirety of the uninsured portion of the loss.312
Thus, if an insurer believes the net amount ultimately paid over stated
coverage limits (including marginal additional Loss Adjusting Expenses)
will be exceeded by the additional net premium captured by lowering full
RCV coverage limits, then the insurer should underestimate replacement
cost.313 Or put another way, an insurer who thought that the insured bore the
312

See generally Baker, supra note 294, at 1430-31 (describing some of
the strategic behaviors of insurers to minimize the claims experience);
Feinman, supra note 3, at 31-33, 80-85; Rutgers Center for Risk and
Responsibility, supra note 231, at 37-44; accord Molk, supra note 11, at 46
(positing that one explanation of his data on valued policies is that “insurers
understand the legal playing field and price their policies accordingly”).
313
Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in Reducing Losses from
Extreme Events: The Need for Public-Private Partnerships, 40 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 741, 750-51 (2015) (“Insurance premiums should be
based on risk to provide individuals with accurate signals as to the nature of
the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective
mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability. Risk-based premiums
should also reflect the cost of capital that insurers need to integrate into their
pricing to assure an adequate return to their investors.”). The premise of
insurance is risk-spreading among the pool of insureds –moral hazard as a
theory of reducing insurance coverage should be inconsistent with this
premise –but that is assuming that the premium has been calculated in an
actuarially sound manner. Marshall, supra note 295, at 880. Premium priced
accurately is loss risk plus underwriting and other transactions costs and
profit. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the
Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMNT. 375,
377-78 (1973), reprinted IN FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS:
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 469, 470-71 (Georges Dionne &
Scott E. Harrington, eds., Kluwer 1991) (Georges Dionne & Scott E.
Harrington, eds., Kluwer 1991) (“Insurance is generally a ‘bad bet.’ That is
to say, the premium is generally greater than the expected property loss
without insurance. The difference between premiums and losses over time is
made up of underwriting and transaction costs and the profit of the insurance
firms.”). Accord Insurance Services Office, supra note 63, at 4 (“An insurer
willing to pay the price of sufficient catastrophe insurance could have trouble
competing for business.”); “Documents for which print copy is practically
available:” Whitepaper, e2Value, How to Buy Data and Why Buy Data 2,
http://e2value.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/E2Value_WP.pdf.
(“Discrepancies between the estimation in a home valuation and the ultimate
cost of rebuilding can present financial risk to firms who don’t get it right.”);
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risk of understated coverage limits and who thought that this would capture
more gross premium would not be troubled by, and indeed might be enthused
by, an underwriting tool and process that understated full replacement
cost.314
Indeed, the Commissioner of the CDOI defended its RCV regulation
(requiring RCV calculations, if done, to include at least twelve delineated
components) to the California Supreme Court, at least in part, on the
assertion that insurers were affirmatively misleading homeowners into
believing that homeowners had adequate replacement coverage:
We must bear in mind that the estimate here is of replacement cost,
which is defined to mean “the amount that it would cost the insured
to repair, rebuild, or replace the thing lost or injured, without a
deduction for physical depreciation, or the policy limit, whichever is
less.” …A consumer would reasonably believe that an estimate
would have considered basic cost components, she would rely on
that estimate to set the limit of liability on the policy, and she would
be bound by that limit in the event of a loss. An incomplete estimate
would result in a low estimate for the primary dwelling (Coverage
A) and would mislead a consumer into believing that the coverage
limit selected as a result of the incomplete estimate is sufficient when
in fact it is not sufficient to rebuild a home. …an insurer would or
should know that an estimate based on incomplete data is
misleading.315
The California Supreme Court found, “The Commissioner could
reasonably conclude that replacement cost estimates are likely to mislead the
public about the actual cost of repair or replacement when they willfully omit

Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, Misselling through Agents, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 883 (2009). See also Collier & Ragin, supra note 62, at 1
(“sellers have incentives to overstate a contract’s benefits or to recommend
suboptimal products”), citing Inderst and Ottaviani. See also Howard C.
Mahler, An Introduction to Underwriting Profit Models (1987),
https://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed85/85239.pdf.
314
See Feinman, supra note 3, at 136-38; accord Bhutta & Keys, supra
note 305, at 11.
315
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 222, at *12-13 (internal
footnote omitted).
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cost components essential to repairing or rebuilding a dwelling.”316 The
Court rejected the challenge to the regulation.317
One might find implausible this explanation of why an insurer might
want to underinsure. But the fact remains that insurers routinely do
underinsure, underinsure by very large margins, and have been doing so now
for decades. The standard in the industry used to be guaranteed replacement
coverage, but for the last almost thirty years it has been RCV with coverage
limits.318 And it bears keeping in mind that the RCV estimation tools claim
to already price in inflation, building cost changes, local market cost
variability, catastrophe risk, and demand surge. If full replacement coverage
limits nonetheless still routinely are materially below actual, accurately
estimated, full replacement costs (they are), then insurers know it and have
known it for a while.319
A bit more needs to be said about one price inflator in particular –
natural disaster. One might posit that what is occurring is the unanticipated
consequence of natural catastrophes. But the insurance industry asserts it has
solved this challenge: “Catastrophe models have been developed and
improved over the past 25 years to more accurately assess the likelihood and
damages resulting from disasters of different magnitudes and intensities.
Today, insurers and reinsurers utilize the estimates from these models to
determine risk-based premiums and how much coverage to offer in hazardprone areas.”320 Today, the insurance industry in general, and Verisk and
CoreLogic in particular, deeply study wildfire and other catastrophe risk,321
and claim they now can expertly underwrite such risk even at the granularity

Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1203 (Cal. 2017).
Id. at 401.
318
See supra Klein, note 3, at 364; Feinman, supra note 3, at 135-36.
319
In the public record of underinsurance complaints after wildfires in
California in 2007, there are repeated references to insurers using Xactware,
RCT, MSB, or generic ‘cost estimators’ – each of these is an instance where
the resulting estimated RCV led to underinsurance. See, e.g., Administrative
Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at
74, 146, 154, 186, 196, 227, 371, 417, 442, 464, 520, 620, 624, 678, 689,
699, 717, 745, 769, 834-35, 969, 974, 993. Guaranteed replacement coverage
stopped being the ‘norm” roughly twenty-five years ago. See supra Klein,
note 3, at 364; Feinman, supra note 3, at 135-36. Insurers have had two and
a half decades of experience with understated replacement costs from cost
estimators.
320
Kunreuther, supra note 313, at 750.
321
See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 157; VERISK, supra note 157.
316
317
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forecasting risk to an individual house.322 And indeed, contrary to intuitive
expectations, catastrophic events do not, on average, have statistically
significant relationships to homeowner insurance market outcomes.323
Simply put, catastrophe loss already is priced into the premium, or at least
so it is claimed. But more to the point, even if demand surge was
inadequately accounted for in the algorithms, then ‘extended’ coverage
riders would be sufficient to cover the additional risk, yet the CDOI found
most of the time even then coverage was inadequate.
B.

AN INSURER MAY BE PUNISHED FOR OVER-INSURING

While an insurer may be rewarded for underinsuring, an insurer also
may be punished for over-insuring. Collier & Ragin found 11.7% of insureds
chose to over-insure.324
Over-insurance is a valid concern for insurers. In valued policy
states, in the event of a total loss an insurer is required to pay the full
coverage limit even if that coverage limit exceeds the actual full replacement
cost.325 An insurer thus may (perhaps should) be worried that a policyholder

322

See, e.g., Scott G. Stephenson, Resilience: Higher Ground in the Face
of Disaster, VERISK (2018), https://www.verisk.com/verisk-review/fall2017/resilience-higher-ground-in-the-face-of-disaster/ (“advanced computer
models can offer a view into scenarios for different perils—the major ones
might include wind, flood, earthquake, and wildfire. Such models can give
[insurers, emergency managers, and government officials] a basic
understanding of potential losses they could experience or are likely to
experience.”); VERISK, supra note 93, at 6 (“Because many of the data
elements needed for replacement cost estimates are the same elements
needed for catastrophe modeling, 360Value is ideally suited to capture the
detailed, property-specific data needed for effective catastrophe analysis.
The point in the underwriting process when replacement cost is reviewed
may also be an ideal opportunity to check on catastrophe risk. 360Value, the
only replacement cost estimator that fully supports catastrophe risk
management programs, can:...assess catastrophe risk on individual
properties before the policy is underwritten using a built-in connection to
AIR Worldwide catastrophe models.”).
323
Patricia Born & Robert W. Klein, Catastrophe Risk and the
Regulation of Property Insurance Markets, 35 J. INS. REG. 1, 31 (2016).
324
Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 12, Table 3.
325
See Molk, supra note 11, at 17, 19.
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would buy excessive insurance as a hedge to escape a financially perilous
position in the wake depreciating home values.326
This is analogous to an “adverse selection problem.”327 “Adverse
selection occurs in insurance markets when information is asymmetric; i.e.,
when an insurer cannot observe an individual’s risk at the time policies are
issued and the individual has superior information about his or her risk.”328
An example of adverse selection in insurance is when the highest risk
individuals disproportionately purchase coverage, thereby raising
everyone’s premiums and pricing the general population out of the market
(a market failure); or put another way, “we tend to trust the people we
shouldn’t!”329
Perhaps because of valued policy states, a lot of work has focused
on insured adverse selection problems.330 And whether in a valued policy
state or not, insurers have a variety of tools to address the concern. An insurer
will engage in ex ante screening of applicants to raise premiums or deny
coverage to an applicant who they expect to have a high claims experience
(an insured apparently adversely selecting the insurer).331 An insurer may,
326

See Molk, supra note 11 (analyzing the theoretical concerns with
valued policies and how the concerns are not borne out by actual behavior).
327
See generally Georges Dionne, Neil Doherty, & Nathalie Fombaron,
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, reprinted in GEORGES DIONNE,
HANDBOOK OF INS. 225 (Georges Dionne et al. eds, 2000) (“Although in
many situations principals face adverse selection and moral hazard problems
simultaneously when they design contracts, these types of asymmetrical
information have been given separate treatments so far in the economic
literature on risk-sharing agreements…More recently, some authors have
attempted to integrate both information problems into a single model ... Such
an integration of both information problems is warranted on empirical
grounds.”).
328
Dionne & Harrington, supra note 207, at 18.
329
Information Economics – Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,
TUTOR2U, https://www.tutor2u.net/economics/reference/information-econo
mics-moral-hazard-and-adverse-selection (last visited Sep. 7, 2018).
330
See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse
Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39, 39-43 (2010).
331
See, e.g., Dionne & Harrington, supra note 207, at 20 (“Experience
rating can be viewed as either a substitute or a compliment to both risk
categorization and sorting contracts with self-selection constraints when
adverse selection is present.”); Robert Puelz & Arthur Snow, Evidence on
Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the
Insurance Market, 102 J. POL ECON. 236, 237, 255 (1994) (“firms engage in
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when permitted by state law, have an insurable interest requirement capping
payouts at the actual loss.332 Or an insurer may simply intentionally resist
high coverage limits.333 Regardless of the approach an insurer takes,
however, an insurer’s passivity in refining cost estimators in ways that would
raise RCV coverage limits may be a predictable and understandable response
to the pressures on an insurer to not over-insure.334
C.

REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS AND MARKET MECHANISMS

A brief word needs to be said about reputational interests and market
mechanisms. One could posit that because of concerns of harm to reputation,
an insurer would not knowingly permit inadequate, unwitting coverage
limits. This conjecture, however, is called into question by e2Value’s market
positioning strategy, and that strategy’s lack of resulting market penetration,
at least so far. The e2Value patent explicitly asserts that it is a cost estimating
innovation that cures the prevalent inaccuracy problems of other estimators.
This is the core of e2Value’s marketing pitch to insurers. Thus far, e2Value
has yet to achieve much of a beachhead in the cost estimating market.
Apparently, the prevalence and depth of inaccurate and inadequate coverage
limits has yet to be a dominating reputational concern among insurers.335
Further, the prevalence of underinsurance is a recurrent news story in the

screening activities by assigning each insurance applicant to a particular risk
category”); Home buyers haunted by past owners’ claims, INSURE.COM (July
6, 2017), https://www.insure.com/home-insurance/past-claims.html (“loss
history reports alert insurers to properties that carry potentially more risk
than they are willing to assume”). See generally Keith J. Crocker & Arthur
Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance
Industry, 94 J. POL ECON. 321 (1986), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF
INSURANCE ECONOMICS: READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 444
(Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1991). Accord Rutgers Center
for Risk and Responsibility, supra note 231, at 22-23.
332
See Molk, supra note 11, at 363.
333
See Molk, supra note 11, at 391. See also Definition of moral hazard,
FT.COM/LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=moral-hazard (“There
are concerns that some individuals that take out large insurance policies to
cover specific risks are likely to claim against such policies.... Insurance
firms...use screening techniques to try and identify such customers and
monitor their behavior.”).
334
Molk, supra note 11, at 386 n.140.
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wake of natural disaster, often punctuated by homeowners calling out
insurers by name. But underinsurance persists unabated.
Similarly, one might expect a properly functioning competitive
market to adjust through normal market mechanisms to punish an insurer
who persistently set coverage limits materially inadequately. The most that
can be said about this expectation is that while explanations as to why may
vary, thus far the market has not evidenced any adjustment.
VII.

A PROPOSED REGULATORY RESOLUTION OF PERVASIVE
UNDERINSURANCE

Homeowner insurance is an interesting market. It is dominated by
low information, largely unengaged, nonetheless arguably highly price
elastic customers, buying coverage that is complex to accurately underwrite
and challenging to price shop.336 In other words, most customers are to some
degree or another apathetic about buying insurance, and to whatever degree
a customer is price sensitive, they often are ill-positioned to do anything
about it.
Simultaneously, insurers face their own challenge. Building a house
is a complex problem. And precisely projecting a replacement cost at an
indeterminate point in the future is an impossibility. If an insurer can shift
risk of error, then one would expect insurers to do so.337 And capping
replacement coverage limits has indeed become a common and effective
insurance strategy for insurers to shift risk to a homeowner and/or
government authority.338 That strategy works because the insurer is working
within a legal landscape that separates risk from responsibility. Companies

Contrast this, for example, with automobile insurance – pricing the
actual or replacement value of a car is straightforward, the likelihood of
material error is small, and price comparison tools are ubiquitous.
337
Santosh Anagol, Shawn Cole, & Shayak Sarkar, Understanding the
Advice of Commissions- Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life
Insurance Market, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2017) (commission structures
caused agents to sell inappropriate life insurance to low information
customers.).
338
See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, The Insurance Industry’s Incredible
Disappearing Weather Catastrophe Risk: How Insurers Have Shifted Risk
and Costs Associated with Weather Catastrophes to Consumers and
Taxpayers, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, Feb. 17, 2012, at 4-6, 911.
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pursue business strategies that the laws (as interpreted) and regulations
reward.339
And yet consider the resulting dilemma consumers of homeowner
insurance finds themselves in: The ubiquitous consumer information of state
insurance commissioners advises homeowners to be cautious and seek full
replacement coverage, and further advises that if the homeowner is unsure
how much that is, then the homeowner should ask their insurer or agent.340
Many insurers or agents, however, will only describe an amount as a
‘minimum’ and will assert that the ultimate responsibility for adequate
insurance is on the homeowner. The legal landscape frequently enforces this
language. The problem is dizzying.
But there is a solution. Fundamentally what is occurring is that the
information and expertise that form the basis of an informed, estimated
replacement cost is remote from the responsibility if that estimate is
profoundly in error.
There are a host of ways one might modify the legal landscape to
close the resulting protection gap.341 But fundamentally, any solution will
fail that assumes either that adequate coverage is susceptible of consistent,
accurate calculation, or that broadly and ubiquitously consumers will
become informed buyers. Facts on the ground repeatedly expose those
approaches as overly Pollyannaish.
Indeed, the CDOI – in defending its regulation defining how to
estimate replacement cost – detailed (albeit inadvertently) many of the
reasons that its solution could fail to remedy the problem of underinsurance:
The Regulation does not affect underwriting. It does not specify,
require, or otherwise mandate…which risks they decide to insure
against, what policy limits they wish to insure, or what price to
charge for a policy. It does not require insurers to estimate
replacement cost or recommend a policy limit, does not prevent
insurers from including additional factors in determining the
estimate, does not prohibit an insurer from setting a minimum or
maximum amount of coverage or any amount of coverage that is

Accord Baker, supra note 294, at 1401 (“All that an insurance
company has to sell is its promise to pay...the better an insurance company
is at avoiding that promise, the more money it makes.”).
340
See supra text accompanying note 69.
341
See, e.g., Holzheu & Turner, supra note 217, at 56-62.
339
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different from the estimate of replacement cost, and does not prohibit
a consumer from obtaining his or her own estimate.342
A more likely to succeed solution would re-couple risk and
responsibility by requiring an insurer essentially to quote guaranteed
replacement coverage and allowing the insurer to underwrite and price that
coverage in anyway it chooses, so long as the rate is approved by the DOI.
If the policyholder chooses to reject that coverage, then the policyholder
bears the risk of underinsurance. If the policyholder accepts that coverage,
then the insurer bears the risk of underinsurance. That legislation might read
something like this:
(a) For every policy of residential property insurance that is newly
issued or renewed in this state, an insurer shall offer insurance
for the full replacement of the insured property.
(b) If the insured purchases the policy or renewal described in
section (a), then in the event that the policy coverage limit is not
sufficient to replace the insured property, the insurer shall be
liable for the actual replacement cost.
(c) If the insured does not purchase the policy or renewal described
in section (a), then in the event that the policy coverage limit is
not sufficient to replace the insured property, the insurer shall
not be liable for the actual replacement cost.
(d) This section shall not be deemed to limit or preclude an insurer
and insured from agreeing to provide coverage for a policy limit
that is greater or lesser than the estimate of replacement value
provided in accordance with subdivision (a).
The advantages to a policyholder of this approach are patent. But
there are advantages to insurers as well. This approach allows each insurer
to model confidence levels and margins of error, and then decide what
business strategy makes most sense to it. One insurer might be aggressive in
pricing premium and calculating limits, determining that the realized volume
of market share justifies the risk exposure of understated limits. Another
insurer might come to a more conservative solution. And both approaches
would be permitted without exposing policyholders or government
resources.
Further, this will reconnect risk creation and risk allocation. The core
challenge is that replacement cost estimators, as with any predictive tool,
have margins of error. It is the seller of the software who sets the parameters
Appellant’s Reply Brief, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th
1009 (internal citations omitted).
342
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and algorithms, and thus can make the estimator neutral, biased to a
conservative estimate, or biased to an aggressive estimate. That is a matter
of negotiation with an insurer and a marketing strategy by the software
company. But the risk of error should be allocated between those two
entities, rather than passed through to an unwitting consumer.
If this solution is adopted, then premiums may rise. And yet, one
must query, why? The providers of replacement cost estimators claim their
tools already precisely underwrite total replacement coverage, accounting
appropriately for general inflation, historical trends in building costs,
localized market idiosyncrasies, demand surge pricing in the wake of mass
loss, and the risk to a particular address of being part of a mass loss. If so,
then prices should not move at all. Frankly, however, recent claims history
in the wake of wildfire suggests that these product claims – at least at present
– range more toward aspirations than descriptions.
If these are (at least for now) hollow promises, then yes, prices will
rise, as they should. It is important to accurately price risk so long as this
does not equate to price gouging. It is a core competency of Departments of
Insurance. And the constant political debate surrounding flood insurance
demonstrates the challenges of trying to artificially suppress price.343 If the
last 30 years stands for nothing else, it serves as stark proof that a world of
unwitting underinsurance carries real and unnecessary cost.344
There will be a concern, of course, that a price elastic, ill-informed
and/or disengaged consumer will decline (to their disadvantage) full
replacement coverage. The experience of consumer buying decisions to date,
however, suggests to the contrary – homeowners largely want full insurance
and largely are willing to pay for it.
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Why the NFIP Differs from a Private Insurance Company, RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE (2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Down
load/RFF-DP-14-37.pdf.
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A separate and perhaps more profound concern is that some areas will
have such high fire risk that insurers will refuse to write insurance quotes at
all. See, e.g., Jackie Botts, As Fire Seasons Intensify, California
Homeowners Struggle to Stay Insured, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://psmag.com/environment/as-fire-seasons-intensify-california-homeo
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CONCLUSION
Natural disasters have exposed that literally millions of Americans,
are unknowingly, profoundly, inadequately insured. This is not only a private
problem, but a public one, as government frequently is the resource of last
resort when homeowners become homeless. The problem of unintended,
significant, widespread underinsurance has been ongoing for decades. But it
is solvable. The solution is to combine the known product of guaranteed
replacement coverage, on the one hand, with preserving the business
flexibility of insurers to idiosyncratically tailor products to consumers, on
the other hand. To paraphrase an apocryphal old advice column, this solution
falls into that special category of appropriate called “high time.”

